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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE NEW PARADIGM OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE U.S.
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT “PATTERN OR PRACTICE” SUITS IN
CONTEXT

SAMUEL WALKER*

I. AMERICAN POLICING TODAY: THE BEST OF TIMES/THE WORST OF TIMES
In April 2001, the city of Cincinnati experienced a riot reminiscent of the
1960s: an outburst of African American rage following the fifteenth fatal
shooting of a young black man by the Cincinnati Police Department in six
years.1 At the same time, the department was sued by local civil rights and
civil liberties groups over racial profiling. The police crisis led to an
investigation of the police department by the Civil Rights Division of the U.S.
Justice Department. In the spring of 2002, the racial profiling suit and the
Justice Department investigation were jointly settled through a Memorandum
of Agreement with the Justice Department and a Collaborative Agreement with
the plaintiffs in the racial profiling suit.2
The two Cincinnati agreements mandate a series of reforms designed to
enhance police accountability. The Memorandum of Agreement requires,
among other changes, a revision of the police department’s policy on the use of
force, the development of policies governing deployment of the canine unit, a
risk management system to identify “problem” officers, and a court appointed

* Isaacson Professor of Criminal Justice, University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE 681820149; samwalker@unomaha.edu. In the interest of disclosure, the author has been directly
involved in some of the activities and reports cited in this article. He was a paid consultant to the
Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice in its investigation of the New Jersey
State Police and the Metropolitan Police Department of Washington, D.C. He also participated in
conferences and discussions that led to the Justice Department report, PRINCIPLES FOR
PROMOTING POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY. See PRINCIPLES, infra note 18.
1. See Francis X. Clines, Appeals for Peace in Ohio After Two Days of Protests, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2001, at A18.
2. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE AND THE CITY OF CINCINNATI, OHIO AND THE CINCINNATI POLICE DEPARTMENT (April
12,
2002),
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/Cincmoafinal.htm
[hereinafter
CINCINNATI
MEMORANDUM]; Collaborative Agreement, In re Cincinnati Policing, No. C-1-99-3170, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15928, at *27 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2002), http://www.cincinnatipolice.org/doj/
finalsettlement.pdf,
also
available
at
http://enquirer.com/editions/2002/04/04/
loc_text_of_collaborative.html.
3
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monitor to oversee implementation of the Agreement.3 The Collaborative
Agreement mandates the Cincinnati Police Department to implement
Community Problem Oriented Policing, the City to consolidate the two
existing citizen complaint agencies into a single agency, and for both the City
and the police department to create an evaluation program including both
surveys of citizens and observations of police work.4
Similar reforms are also contained in the consent decrees and memoranda
of understanding secured by the Justice Department to settle investigations of
police misconduct in other cities. The Justice Department is acting under
authority of 42 U.S.C § 14141, which authorizes the Attorney General to bring
civil suits against police departments where there is a “pattern or practice” of
violations of citizens’ rights.5 To date, there have been a total of eight such
settlements, with the most highly publicized ones involving the Pittsburgh
Police Bureau,6 the New Jersey State Police,7 the Los Angeles Police
Department,8 and the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of

3. CINCINNATI MEMORANDUM, supra note 2.
4. In re Cincinnati Policing, supra note 2, at *19-20.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2002).
§ 14141. Cause of action.
(a) Unlawful conduct.
It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent thereof, or any
person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of
conduct by law enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any governmental
agency with responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice or the incarceration of
juveniles that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by
the Constitution or laws of the United States.
(b) Civil action by Attorney General.
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that a violation of
paragraph (1) has occurred, the Attorney General, for or in the name of the United States,
may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the
pattern or practice.
Id.
6. See Consent Decree, United States v. Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354 (W.D. Pa. approved Apr.
16, 1997) [hereinafter Pittsburgh Decree], http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/pittssa.htm.
7. See Joint Application for Entry of Consent Decree, United States v. New Jersey, No. 995970 (D. N.J. approved Dec. 30, 1999) [hereinafter N.J. Decree], http://www.usdoj.gov/
crt/split/documents/jerseysa.htm; see also PETER VERNIERO & PAUL H. ZOUBEK, INTERIM
REPORT REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING (1999), http://www.state.nj.us/lps/
intm_419.pdf.
8. Consent Decree, United States v. Los Angeles, No. 00-11769 (C.D. Cal. approved June
15, 2001) [hereinafter L.A. Decree], http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/laconsent.htm; see
also BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO THE RAMPART AREA CORRUPTION INCIDENT, LOS ANGELES
POLICE DEPARTMENT, PUBLIC REPORT (2000), www.lapdonline.org/pdf_files/pc/boi_pub.pdf;
RAMPART INDEP. REVIEW PANEL, REPORT OF THE RAMPART INDEP. REVIEW PANEL (2000),
http://www.ci.la.ca.us/oig/rirprpt.pdf.
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Columbia.9 At the same time, similar settlements have been reached in suits
by the Attorney General of California against the City of Riverside,10 the
Attorney General of New York against the Town of Wallkill,11 and a private
suit by the NAACP and the ACLU against the Philadelphia Police
Department.12
The police problems in Cincinnati, Los Angeles, New Jersey, and other
locales might well lead a reasonable person—that is, someone well-informed
about civic events but with no special expertise in policing—to conclude that
the American police have made little if any progress since the strife-torn
decade of the 1960s.13 Racism, brutality, and corruption might appear to be as
prevalent and serious today as they were then. This might also suggest that the
various police reforms of the last thirty years have been for naught. These
reforms include Supreme Court limits on police practices,14 community
policing and problem-oriented policing,15 a significant increase in the number
of African-American, Hispanic and female police officers,16 and dramatic
improvements in police officer educational levels and training programs.17
Our hypothetical reasonable person, however, would be misled by the
events that have dominated the news. Quietly, and with little publicity, a
number of police departments have made significant progress with regard to
police accountability in recent years and have taken steps to curb excessive
force, unjustified shootings, and other forms of misconduct. The best

9. See MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN
POLICE DEPARTMENT (June 13, 2001) [hereinafter D.C. MEMORANDUM], http://www.usdoj.gov/
crt/split/documents/dcmoa.htm.
10. Stipulation for Entry of Judgment, California v. City of Riverside (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Riverside County, Att’y Gen. Draft of Feb. 12, 2001) (on file with author).
11. First Report of the Monitor, New York v. Town of Wallkill, No. 01-CIV-0364 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 2002) (on file with author).
12. NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, No. 96-6045 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1996) (on file with
author).
13. See generally NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968). This commission is also
known as the Kerner Commission.
14. See THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW JUSTICE, AND POLICING (Richard A. Leo and George
C. Thomas eds., 1998).
15. See generally Jack R. Greene, Community Policing in America: Changing the Nature,
Structure, and Function of the Police, in POLICIES, PROCESSES, AND DECISIONS OF THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 299 (J. Horney ed., 2000); MICHAEL S. SCOTT, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST 20 YEARS (2000).
16. SAMUEL WALKER & CHARLES M. KATZ, THE POLICE IN AMERICA (4th ed. 2002).
17. See DAVID L. CARTER ET AL., THE STATE OF POLICE EDUCATION: POLICY DIRECTION
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 73 (1989); see also WALKER & KATZ, supra note 16, at 387, 431-38
(reviewing trends in policing).
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indicators of this development are, ironically, the consent decrees and
memoranda of understanding secured by the Justice Department under §
14141. The specific reforms mandated in those agreements were not developed
by the Justice Department itself but were drawn from recognized “best
practices” related to accountability already in place in other more progressive
police departments.18 In effect, the consent decrees have ratified and given the
Justice Department’s sanction to a new consensus regarding reforms designed
to promote police accountability.
The purpose of this article is to place the Justice Department’s consent
decrees and memoranda of understanding under § 14141 in a broader context
of police reform efforts.19 Taken as a whole, these reforms represent a new
paradigm of police accountability, which includes not just a specific set of
“best practices” but also an overarching conceptual framework of
accountability. With reference to the most important provisions of the consent
decrees and memoranda of understanding related to Pittsburgh, the New Jersey
State Police, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., and Cincinnati, this article
assesses the nature and significance of the new paradigm of accountability.
II. ELEMENTS OF THE NEW PARADIGM
The new paradigm of police accountability consists of five elements.
A.

A Short List of Best Practices

The first element is an emerging consensus of opinion on a short list of
best practices designed to enhance accountability. These best practices include:
(a) a comprehensive use-of-force reporting system,20 (b) an open and
accessible citizen complaint system,21 (c) an early intervention (or warning)

18. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES FOR PROMOTING POLICE INTEGRITY 3 (2001),
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/ojp/186189.pdf [hereinafter PRINCIPLES], which presents the best
summary of these best practices. This report was developed through a series of Justice
Department sponsored conferences as workshops in the preceding years. See also U. S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S CONFERENCE: STRENGTHENING POLICE-COMMUNITY
RELATIONSHIPS, SUMMARY REPORT (June 1999) (on file with author) [herinafter ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S CONFERENCE].
19. For a preliminary assessment following the first two § 14141 cases, see Debra
Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 815, 844 (1999).
20. See generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, USE OF FORCE BY POLICE: OVERVIEW
OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL DATA 21-22 (1999) (discussing use-of-force policies and presenting
data).
21. See generally SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF CITIZEN
OVERSIGHT 5-7 (2001) (discussing various methods of citizen complaint procedures).
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system to identify potential “problem” officers,22 and (d) the collection of data
on traffic stops for the purpose of curbing racial profiling.23 The best summary
statement of these best practices is the January 2001 Justice Department report,
Principles for Promoting Police Integrity, issued in the last days of the Clinton
Administration.24 In various ways, these best practices are incorporated into
all of the consent decrees and memoranda of understanding currently in
force.25
B.

Conceptual Framework

Second, the new paradigm involves an overarching conceptual framework
for the best practices cited above. The new framework emphasizes changing
police organizations, as opposed to pursuing individual officers guilty of
misconduct, for the purpose of cultivating an organizational culture that will
sustain professional conduct in the future.26 In an initial assessment of the
Justice Department’s efforts under § 14141, Debra Livingston argues that the
“conclusion drawn by many police scholars” is that “police reform will be
most effective . . . when reform involves not simply adherence to rules in the
fact of punitive sanctions, but a change in the organizational values and
systems to which both managers and line officers adhere.”27 Section 14141
specifically authorizes the Justice Department to bring suit against police
organizations rather than individual officers.28 As this article argues, one of
the limits of many previous police reforms is that they have been narrowly
directed toward particular organizational problems or to punishing individual
officers guilty of misconduct. These efforts have not achieved lasting

22. See generally Samuel Walker, et al., Early Warning Systems for Police: Responding to
the Problem Police Officer, RESEARCH IN BRIEF (U.S. Dep’t of Justice/Nat’l Inst. Of Justice,
Washington D.C.), July 2001 [hereinafter Early Warning], http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/
188565.pdf; SAMUEL WALKER, EARLY INTERVENTION SYSTEMS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES: A PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT GUIDE (2002) (unpublished report submitted to the
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services) (on file with author)
[hereinafter EARLY INTERVENTION].
23. See generally DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING
CANNOT WORK 175-77 (2002) [hereinafter PROFILES]; DAVID A. HARRIS, ACLU, DRIVING
WHILE BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NATION’S HIGHWAYS (June 1999),
http://archive.aclu.org/profiling/report/index.html [hereinafter DRIVING WHILE BLACK].
24. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18.
25. Provisions of the various consent decrees are referenced below in the context of
discussions of particular issues.
26. This point is argued in WALKER, supra note 21, at 109.
27. Livingston, supra note 19, at 848.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2002). See supra note 5 in which the statutory text is presented.
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improvements, in large part, because dysfunctional organizational cultures
limit or undermine reforms or condone misconduct by other officers.29
C. Collection and Analysis of Systematic Data
Third, the operational strategy of the new paradigm involves the collection
and analysis of systematic data on officer performance for the purpose of
identifying recurring problems that merit corrective action. This strategy
closely parallels developments in policing, medicine,30 private enterprise, and
other government agencies,31 which focus on the collection and analysis of
systematic agency performance. One of the most celebrated recent reforms in
policing, COMPSTAT, involves the collection and analysis of systematic data
on crime patterns for the purpose of focusing crime reduction efforts.32 The
reform strategy is illustrated by a comment from Merrick Bobb, Special
Counsel to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD), in a report on one
troubled unit in the LASD. He concludes by observing: “[T]his chapter began
with a discussion about numbers and ended with a discussion about
management. This is how it should be.”33 The reform strategy of the new
paradigm, instead of focusing on individual officers, uses comprehensive data
about agency and officer performance to identify management problems that
are likely to lead to misconduct by individual officers.
D. Convergence of Internal and External Strategies
Fourth, the new paradigm represents the convergence of two strategies for
accountability that have historically been seen as competing alternatives.34

29. “The [LAPD’s] Board of Inquiry report fails to recognize that the central problem is the
culture of the Los Angeles Police Department, which gave rise to and tolerated what occurred in
the Rampart Division and elsewhere.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, AN INDEP. ANALYSIS OF THE LOS
ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT’S BOARD OF INQUIRY REPORT ON THE RAMPART SCANDAL
(2000), reprinted in 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 549, 551 (2001). See also RAMPART INDEP. REVIEW
PANEL, supra note 8, at 2.
30. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN 77-78 (1999).
31. For
example,
consider
Baltimore’s
CitiStat
program,
described
at
http://www.ci.baltimore.md.us/news/citistat/index.html, as a data collection and analysis tool
useful for all city agencies.
32. See David Weisburd, Steven D. Mastrofski, A. M. McNally, R. Greenspan, J. J. Willis,
Reforming to Preserve: Compstat and Strategic Problem Solving in American Policing (2002)
(unpublished article prepared for the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nat’l Inst. of Justice, under review
with CRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY, and on file with author); see also JACK MAPLE, THE
CRIME FIGHTER 33 (1999).
33. MERRICK J. BOBB ET AL., LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T, 15TH SEMIANNUAL
REP. 9-35 (2002) [hereinafter 15TH SEMIANNUAL], http://lacounty.info/mbobb15.pdf, also
available at http://www.co.la.ca.us/bobbreports/mbobb15.pdf
34. See text at Part IV infra.
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Traditionally, the police vigorously insisted that they have both the
responsibility and the capacity to manage their own affairs—including matters
of discipline—free of external intervention. Civil rights activists, despairing of
the capacity of police departments to police themselves, have pursued a variety
of external mechanisms of accountability.35 These mechanisms have included
the intervention of the courts, particularly with respect to constitutional
standards for police work, and external citizen oversight agencies to handle
citizen complaints. A bitter struggle between the claims of professional
autonomy and external oversight defines much of the politics of policing over
the previous four decades. In this struggle, internal and external mechanisms of
accountability have been seen as competing and irreconcilable alternatives.
This article argues, to the contrary, that in the new paradigm internal and
external mechanisms merge to form a mutually reinforcing, “mixed” structure
of accountability.36
E.

Building on Past Reforms

Fifth, the new paradigm builds upon past police reforms, taking into
account both their shortcomings and accomplishments. The result is a more
sophisticated awareness of the conditions necessary for achieving genuine
accountability in policing. In brief, these requirements are threefold: that to be
effective any reform must (a) reach deep into the police organization; (b) have
some direct impact on the day-to-day behavior of police officers; and (c)
ultimately change, or at least begin to change, the culture of police
organizations.37 The new paradigm of accountability takes these conditions
into account and represents a significant advance over prior reform efforts.
III. POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY DEFINED
Police accountability consists of several different dimensions.38 In a
democratic society the police should be answerable to the public for both what

35. Walker, supra note 21, at 24.
36. OFFICE OF INDEP. REVIEW, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, FIRST REPORT (2002),
http://www.laoir.com/report1.pdf; ELLEN GREEN-CEISLER, INTEGRITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT, ENFORCEMENT OF NARCOTICS LAWS (2002),
http://inquirer.philly.com/specials/2002/narcotics/report.htm.
37. See Chemerinsky, supra note 29, at 4; WILLAM A. WESTLEY, VIOLENCE AND THE
POLICE: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF LAW, CUSTOM, AND MORALITY (1970) (the classic work on
the norms of secrecy in the police subculture).
38. The literature on American policing is disturbingly scant on the subject of accountability.
This summary of the dimensions of accountability is taken from THE INDEP. COMM’N ON
POLICING IN N. IR., A NEW BEGINNING: POLICING IN NORTHERN IRELAND 22 (1999),
http://www.belfast.org.uk/report/fullreport.pdf. A fuller discussion will appear in NAT’L
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they do—law enforcement, order maintenance, and the provision of
miscellaneous public services—and how they conduct themselves. This article
focuses exclusively on issues related to what has been called the integrity or
legitimacy of the police in their treatment of individual citizens and
demographic groups.39 In brief, the police are expected to treat citizens in a
lawful, respectful, and equal manner. The tragic history of American policing
involves a long history of physical brutality, corruption, violations of
constitutional rights, and race discrimination.40 As the next section of this
article argues, previous reform efforts have not adequately curbed these
abuses. This article does not address accountability issues related to the crimefighting effectiveness or the efficiency of police operations, although both are
matters for which the police should be held accountable.41
One of the central dilemmas of policing in a democratic society is that the
demands of the public and the law often conflict. The political process is the
basic means of ensuring that the police reflect the will of the people. Mayors,
city council members, county commissioners, governors, state legislatures,
presidents, and the Congress exercise control and oversight through budgets
and appointments.42 At the same time, the police are also accountable to the
law and should conform to established standards of legality in all of their
operations (including not just law enforcement activities such as arrests and
searches and seizures, but also personnel procedures involving equal
employment opportunity, sexual harassment, and so on). The courts are the
principal mechanism for this aspect of accountability. The history of American
criminal justice is replete with episodes where public demands conflict with
legal standards. In policing this usually involves the majority demanding the
police do things that are illegal, as in overly aggressive law enforcement tactics
that violate the rights of individuals or entire classes of persons.43 In a classic

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE EVIDENCE ON POLICING: FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN U.S.
LAW ENFORCEMENT (forthcoming 2002).
39. The term “legitimacy” is increasingly used to encompass the related issues of police
compliance with the law and citizen perceptions of the police. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, supra note 38.
40. See generally SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM, THE
EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1977); ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE (1977).
41. Geoffrey P. Alpert & Mark H. Moore, Measuring Police Performance in the New
Paradigm, in BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 109 (1993).
42. See WALKER & KATZ, supra note 16, at 351-56.
43. This is the central theme in SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2nd ed. 1998). See also JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT
TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (3rd ed. 1994).
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statement of the problem, Herbert Packer defined it in terms of a clash between
crime control and due process perspectives on the criminal process.44
The political dilemma involving conflicting demands on the police
translates into policy dilemmas regarding alternative mechanisms for
enhancing police accountability. This has generally taken the form of tensions
between internal mechanisms, in the form of professional management and
supervision, and external mechanisms, in the form of direct political control,
the courts, and external review agencies.45 Part IV of this article reviews the
contributions and shortcomings of the various internal and external
accountability mechanisms in order to establish the context for the new
paradigm.
IV. TRADITIONAL POLICE REFORMS: ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND LIMITATIONS
The modern police reform movement is just over one hundred years old.46
Traditional strategies for achieving police accountability may be divided into
three categories that roughly parallel the three branches of American
government: administrative, judicial, and legislative.
A.

The Administrative Strategy: Professional Police Management
1. The Police Professionalism Movement

The principal internal mechanism of police accountability is embodied in
the administrative strategy of professional police management. The
professionalization movement emerged in the early years of the twentieth
century.47 The reform agenda of the professionalism movement included
expert leadership, freedom from external (especially political) influence, the
application of the principles of modern management to police organizations,
and elevation of personnel standards, both through higher minimum
recruitment standards and better training.48 The classic statements of
professional police management are found in the reports and text books by,
first, August Vollmer,49 and later his disciple, O. W. Wilson. Wilson’s text,

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149 (1968).
See discussion infra Part IV.A-D.
WALKER, supra note 40.
Id.
Id.
NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON POLICE:
POLICE CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1931). August Vollmer served as the principal
author of the report, which summarized ideas he had developed in previous reports on local police
departments. This commission is also known as the Wickersham Commission.
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Police Administration, served as the virtual “bible” for police chiefs from the
1950s through the 1970s.50
The core principle of police professionalism is that law enforcement
agencies have both a responsibility and a right to manage their own affairs, just
as other professions enjoy a high degree of autonomy and control over their
domains.51 To this end, generations of police managers have strenuously
fought the actual or threatened intrusions into their managerial prerogatives,
whether by the U.S. Supreme Court, citizen oversight agencies, or police
unions.52
The professionalism movement achieved many improvements in American
policing. Most police departments were far better managed in the 1960s than
they were in 1900.53 Personnel standards, as indicated by minimum entry
requirements and formal pre-service training programs, were far higher
(although this author has argued that at that time there were, for all practical
purposes, no “standards” in the modern sense at all).54 Most police
departments assigned more patrol officers to high crime areas, and made other
efforts to allocate personnel on a rational basis. Police chiefs’ obsession with
adding more patrol cars and acquiring sophisticated communications
technology reflected a sincere effort to provide better service by responding as
quickly as possible to all citizen calls for service.55 Compared with the utter
lack of professionalism that prevailed through the late nineteenth century,

50. O. W. WILSON AND R. C. MCLAREN, POLICE ADMINISTRATION (4th ed. 1977).
51. See the provocative discussion of the development of a police monopoly over their
professional mandate in PETER K. MANNING, POLICE WORK: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF
POLICING (1977). A critique of this insular professional monopoly over the delivery of public
services is one of the core principles of the community policing movement. George L. Kelling
and Mark H. Moore, The Evolving Strategy of Policing, PERSPECTIVES ON POLICING, Nov. 1988,
at 1, 10-14.
52. For a contemporary account of the fierce reaction to the Supreme Court, see FRED P.
GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND (1970). On the reaction to police unions, see generally
PETER FEUILLE, POLICE UNIONISM (1973). On citizen oversight, see WALKER, supra note 21. See
the various contributions in the valuable collection, POLICE LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA: CRISIS
AND OPPORTUNITY (William A. Geller ed., 1985).
53. It is possible to benchmark improvements in policing by comparing the data on police in:
Leonard P. Ayres, The Cleveland Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice, Address
Before the City Club of Cleveland (Feb. 18, 1922), in THE CLEVELAND SURVEY OF THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1922, at 4-9 (the first of the modern crime
commissions); NATIONAL COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
CRIMINAL STATISTICS (1931) (the first national crime commission); THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE (1967).
54. WALKER, supra note 40.
55. WALKER, supra note 43, at 165-167.
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when police departments were the “adjuncts” of political machines, the
achievements of the professionalism movement were substantial.56
2. The Shortcomings of Professionalism
In the 1960s the American police were engulfed in a national crisis that
exposed serious problems and called into question both the achievements and
the assumptions of the professional management approach. The crisis was
provoked by two developments: the intervention of the U.S. Supreme Court
into police operations and the civil rights movement.
In a series of landmark cases, the U.S. Supreme Court intervened into
previously unregulated aspects of routine police procedures, notably searches
and seizures and in-custody interrogations, and imposed new constitutional
standards for police conduct.57 From the standpoint of accountability, the
significant aspect of the Court’s activism is that it exposed the extent to which
police managers had failed to govern effectively the exercise of police
authority. In a disturbing commentary on traditional police professionalism, the
Kerner Commission noted that “many of the serious disturbances took place in
cities whose police departments are among the best led, best organized, best
trained, and most professional in the country.”58 In the Los Angeles Police
Department, for example, professionalism involved an aggressive crimefighting style that included such tactics as frequent stops and frisks that
aggravated community relations. The Court’s intervention not only forced
departments to revise their policies and procedures to conform to new
constitutional standards but, in the process, also stimulated a larger process of
reform.59
At the same time, the civil rights movement challenged abuses of police
power, particularly the use of both deadly and physical force, discriminatory
enforcement of the laws, and race discrimination in employment.60 Virtually
all of the urban riots of the 1964-1968 period were sparked by an incident
involving the police.61 The police officer in the ghetto became the symbol of
the national crisis in race relations. The principal demands of civil rights

56. The characterization of the police as “adjuncts to the machine” is in ROBERT FOGELSON,
BIG-CITY POLICE 13 (1977).
57. For a discussion of these cases see Samuel Walker, Historical Roots of the Legal Control
of Police Behavior, in POLICE INNOVATION AND CONTROL OF THE POLICE (David Weisburd and
Craig Uchida eds., 1993).
58. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 13, at 301.
59. Walker, supra note 57, at 32.
60. JEROME H. SKOLNICK, THE POLITICS OF PROTEST 241-292 (1969). WALKER, supra note
40, at 124-25.
61. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 13, at 68.
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leaders became the hiring of more African-American officers and the creation
of civilian review boards to handle citizen complaints.62
An examination of O.W. Wilson’s Police Administration text dramatizes
what the professional management strategy failed to do with respect to
accountability. Even the fourth edition published in 1977 contains no reference
to police discretion and devotes a total of four pages (out of more than 600) to
supervision through “written directives,” or what is today recognized as
administrative rulemaking.63 Moreover, the discussion is couched in generic
terms and makes no specific reference to the use of deadly force, physical
force, high-speed pursuits, or other critical uses of police power. There is no
acknowledgment of the pervasive exercise of discretion, nor recognition of the
extent to which discretion can be abused and result in violations of individual
citizens’ rights, including unequal enforcement of the law and the use of
excessive physical force and unjustified deadly force.
The principal failure of traditional professional police management was
that it represented organizational formalism. It assumed that accountability
would be achieved by means of a correctly designed organizational structure
with clear lines of authority and reporting, together with the rational allocation
of personnel according to workload. Missing from this approach was any
explicit discussion of what police officers actually do on the street (the subject
that has been at the core of sociological studies of policing since the late
1950s),64 the situations they routinely encounter, the fact that they exercise
broad discretion in choosing among alternative responses, and that without
specific guidance they might make bad decisions that could violate citizens’
rights.65 Wilson’s administrative formalism, in short, assumed that the
arrangement he recommended would reach down into the organization and
shape officer behavior, but in fact it failed to do so.
3. Administrative Rulemaking
Detailed rules designed to control officer behavior began to emerge in the
1960s through the technique of administrative rulemaking. The basic tool of
police management today, the departmental standard operating procedure
manual, is typically a large loose-leaf notebook consolidating all current rules
and regulations. Administrative rulemaking also lies at the core of the new
paradigm of police accountability.66 The history of the development of

62. WALKER, supra note 43, at 180-183, 193-201.
63. WILSON AND MCLAREN, supra note 50, at 136-141.
64. Samuel Walker, Origins of the Contemporary Criminal Justice Paradigm: The American
Bar Foundation Survey, 1953-1969, 9 JUST.Q. 47, 50 (1992).
65. NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 38.
66. See text at Part V infra.
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administrative rulemaking in policing is extremely complex and uneven. Police
departments always had some rules governing police officer behavior. But as
the discussion of the limits of professional management in the previous section
indicated, as late as the early 1960s existing rules generally ignored the critical
issues of police use of authority and/or were couched in such general terms that
they provided no meaningful guidance.
Several general themes in the history of police rulemaking should be
noted. First, rulemaking in policing emerged rather late compared with
developments in the field of administrative law in general. Herman Goldstein
was the first authority to propose rulemaking as a management response to the
problem of police discretion.67 The first full discussion of the subject did not
appear until 1975, with Kenneth C. Davis’s 1975 book Police Discretion.68
This was almost thirty years after enactment of the federal Administrative
Procedure Act, which established basic principles and process of rulemaking.69
Second, rulemaking developed late because it was not a part of the tradition of
O.W. Wilson-style of police management, and this constitutes one of the great
failures of that reform tradition. Third, rulemaking was, for all practical
purposes, forced on the police by external forces. As already suggested, the
Supreme Court initiated the process in its rulings on searches and seizures and
in-custody interrogations. In the 1970s, as the Court began to withdraw from
oversight of the police, rulemaking continued to develop in response to social
protest and litigation in the areas of deadly force, domestic violence, and high
speed pursuits.70
The essential features of administrative rulemaking are well-known. In
brief, it is designed to fill in the gap between law and practice. Statutes define
the general responsibilities of public agencies but are not sufficiently detailed

67. Herman Goldstein, Administrative Problems in Controlling the Exercise of Police
Authority, 58 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 160 (1967) [hereinafter Administrative
Problems]; Herman Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal for Improving Police
Performance, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1123 (1967). Goldstein played a pivotal role in the development
of rulemaking. He was a field researcher for the American Bar Foundation Survey in the late
1950s, which essentially discovered the problem of police discretion. See WAYNE LAFAVE,
ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 157-58 (Frank J. Remington ed.,
1965). Goldstein and Frank Remington of the University of Wisconsin Law School were the
principal authors of the first two chapters of THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE (1967), which initiated the
discussion of police rulemaking.
68. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975). Davis was a leading authority on
administrative law, and author of the first treatise on the subject, KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1951).
69. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 65 (1969).
70. Id.; DAVIS, supra note 68; SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF
DISCRETION IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950-1990, 33 (1993).
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to cover all of the contingencies that arise. Through rulemaking, agencies
promulgate their own internal rules to fill this gap and to provide guidance to
front-line workers who make the critical decisions in implementing official
policy.
Police rulemaking has two core elements. Substantively, rules confine
discretion by specifying what officers may and may not do in certain
situations. Current deadly force policies, for example, limit shootings to
situations where there is a threat to the life of the officer or some other
person.71 Domestic violence policies typically specify that an arrest is either
the required or preferred response to a situation where there is evidence that a
felonious assault has occurred.72 Rules also structure discretion by specifying
the factors that an officer should consider in the proper exercise of discretion.
High speed pursuit policies, for example, instruct officers to consider road
conditions and the potential risk to pedestrians or other vehicles before
initiating a pursuit.73
Procedurally, rules check discretion by requiring officers to file official
reports on particular incidents. These reports are then automatically reviewed
by supervisors. This report and review process forces officers, in a very literal
sense, “to account” for their actions. In the context of police history, the rules
on deadly force, domestic violence, and pursuits are significant because
officers had not previously been required to account for their actions or to face
an automatic review of critical incidents.74 In discussing the “long march”
toward the current defense of life standard for use of deadly force, Geller and
Scott observe: “During the 1950s and 1960s, some police policy manuals still

71. WILLIAM A. GELLER & MICHAEL S. SCOTT, DEADLY FORCE: WHAT WE KNOW (1992)
(presenting a history of police deadly force policies). Arguably, the watershed event in police
rulemaking was the promulgation of Policy #237 by New York City Police Commissioner Patrick
V. Murphy in 1972. The policy abolished the old fleeing felon rule and substituted the far more
restrictive defense of life standard. The policy also required NYPD officers to file a report after
each firearms discharge and created a procedure for reviewing each and every report. James J.
Fyfe, Administrative Interventions on Police Shooting Discretion: An Empirical Examination, 7 J.
CRIM. JUST. 309, 311-12 (1979). Curiously, Murphy does not mention this, perhaps his most
important and lasting accomplishment, in his autobiography. PATRICK V. MURPHY & THOMAS
PLATE, COMMISSIONER: A VIEW FROM THE TOP OF AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1977).
72. See generally DONALD BLACK, THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE POLICE 85-86
(1980) (providing research that indicates that officers based arrest decisions on non-legal factors
such as the complainant’s preference or the social relationship between the complainant and the
suspect).
73. GEOFFREY P. ALPERT & ROGER G. DUNHAM, POLICE PURSUIT DRIVING: CONTROLLING
RESPONSES TO EMERGENCY SITUATIONS 7 (1990).
74. See PAUL JACOBS, PRELUDE TO RIOT 18-62 (1966) (discussing the lack of accountability
in the Los Angeles Police Department in the mid-1960s).
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made no mention whatsoever of the criteria governing when officers could
properly use deadly force.”75
There is evidence in at least some areas of policing that rulemaking does
achieve its intended goals. The most persuasive evidence relates to police use
of deadly force. The number of citizens shot and killed by the police dropped
significantly between the late 1960s and late 1970s (but have remained stable
since then).76 Perhaps even more important, the racial disparity between white
and African-American citizens shot and killed has been cut in half between the
1970s and 1990s.77 Research has also found that restrictive high-speed pursuit
policies effectively reduce the number of pursuits, the number of accidents,
and the number of both citizens and officers injured.78 At present, however,
there is no clear evidence that domestic violence, arrest-preferred policies
result in more arrests of spouse assailants. Nor is there any clear evidence that
policies controlling the use of non-lethal force reduce such usage.79
While a major step forward, administrative rulemaking in policing has
serious limits. Its development has been haphazard and inconsistent. Many
critical areas of police work remain ungoverned by rules (e.g., the use of
informants, other undercover tactics, deployment of the canine unit, etc.).
Many departments, meanwhile, have rules on the use of force that are not as
comprehensive as they could be (e.g., limiting use of force reporting to
incidents where there is injury). Finally, and most importantly, the existence of
a written rule hardly guarantees that it is implemented as intended. The
implementation of rules and other elements of the new paradigm is discussed
below.
Administrative rulemaking is a central part of the consent decrees and
memoranda of understanding secured by the Justice Department in its litigation
under § 14141. The specific applications are discussed later in this article.
B.

The Judicial Strategy: The Courts as an Instrument of Police Reform

The void left by the professional management strategy gave rise to two
major reform efforts seeking to impose external mechanisms of accountability.
The most important of these involved using the courts as an instrument of
police accountability. (The second, external citizen oversight is considered in
the next section.) The courts offer several different opportunities for pursuing
75. GELLER & SCOTT, supra note 71 at 251; see LAFAVE, supra note 67, at 209-10.
76. JODI M. BROWN & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, POLICING AND HOMICIDE, 1976-98: JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE BY POLICE, POLICE
OFFICERS MURDERED BY FELONS 3 (March, 2001).
77. Id.
78. GEOFFREY P. ALPERT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, POLICE
PURSUIT: POLICIES AND TRAINING 4 (May, 1997).
79. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 20.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

18

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:3

police accountability: constitutional standards for police work, tort litigation,
and criminal prosecution.
1. The Constitution as a Code of Criminal Procedure
One of the most significant events in American policing over the past half
century was the intervention of the U.S. Supreme Court into matters of routine
police work. The “due process revolution” in criminal justice was only one
chapter of the momentous role of the Warren Court in imposing constitutional
standards on many, if not most, areas of American life, and asserting itself as a
major maker of social policy. In policing, the Court intervened into previously
neglected areas of police procedure and fashioned a new set of rules based on
constitutional law. Civil rights and civil liberties advocates hailed the Court’s
activism and invested in it great hopes for police reform. Some experts argue
that by establishing constitutional principles as a minimum standard for police
work, the Court reshaped the debate over police reform and stimulated lasting
reforms.80 The controversies surrounding the famous Mapp and Miranda
decisions remain live issues into the present day.81
Despite the enormous importance of the Supreme Court rulings on police
procedure, even many police experts who fully support an activist Court role
recognize the limits of the Court as an instrument of police reform.82 While
the Court can enunciate grand principles of constitutional law, it lacks the
institutional capacity to ensure compliance on a day-to-day basis. The Court
rules only on those issues that are brought before it, and most police activities
remain uncovered by any Court decision. If an illegal search does not result in
prosecution and conviction, for example, there is no grounds for an appeal
under Mapp. Compliance with Court decisions is uneven at best. Police
officers have available numerous strategies for evading the intent of both Mapp
and Miranda, to cite the two most important cases. There is a substantial
literature on police compliance with (and evasion of) Court rulings.83 Finally,
federal courts have no ability to ensure that all officers are even informed of
important new decisions.84

80. WALKER, supra note 70, at 11.
81. THE MIRANDA DEBATE, supra note 14.
82. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 414-15 (1974); Livingston, supra note 19, at 819.
83. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical
Study of the Effects of Miranda (1996), in THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING
222, 230-231 (Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas III eds., 1998); See Richard H. Seeburger &
R. Stanton Wettick, Jr., Miranda in Pittsburgh—A statistical study, in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS: EMPIRICAL STUDIES 150, 152 (Theodore L. Becker & Malcolm M. Feeley
eds., 2d. ed. 1973).
84. See STEPHEN L. WASBY, SMALL TOWN POLICE AND THE SUPREME COURT 217 (1976).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

THE NEW PARADIGM OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY

19

2. Tort Litigation
Civil rights and civil liberties activists have also employed tort litigation,
under federal or state law, as a strategy for enhancing police accountability.
Apart from compensation for individual plaintiffs, the reform strategy assumes
that if the dollar cost of police misconduct is raised to a critical level, local
elected officials will respond by adopting the techniques of risk management
and, thereby, impose meaningful police reforms.85 The strategy assumes that
financial pressure might succeed where appeals to law and human rights fail.
There is little evidence that the tort litigation strategy has succeeded.
Academic studies of the strategy have generally found little direct impact on
police reform.86 The flaw in the strategy appears to be the assumption that
public officials will act in a rational and coordinated manner in response to
rising litigation costs. Instead, there appears to be a general pattern of
disconnection and indifference rather than coordination and rationality in local
governments. The general pattern appears to be that one unit (the police)
engages in misconduct, another unit defends it in court, and another writes the
check for damages. There is little evidence that mayors, city council members,
or county officials have adopted the techniques of risk management to curb
costs arising from police misconduct litigation, even when those costs are
publicized in the local news media. Human Rights Watch, for example, quoted
one police internal affairs officer as saying “civil cases are not our problem.”87
A recent survey of police risk management programs found that even those
programs that claim to have reduced litigation costs do not collect and publish
data that would verify these claims.88
The one documented case of a jurisdiction responding effectively to rising
litigation costs is Los Angeles County, which created the Special Counsel to
the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department (LASD) in 1993. Because the
office of the Special Counsel is properly considered a form of citizen oversight
it is discussed below.89

85. See CAROL A. ARCHBOLD, INNOVATIONS IN POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: AN
EXPLORATORY STUDY OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND POLICE LEGAL ADVISING 9-10 (2002), at
http://www.policeaccountability.org.
86. See Lant B. Davis et al., Project: Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781,
812-14 (1979); Candace McCoy, Enforcement Workshop: Lawsuits Against Police—What Impact
Do They Really Have?, 20 CRIM. L. BULL. 49, 54 (1983); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED
FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES at 85 (1998)
(concluding that civil litigation “must always be available, but cannot be a substitute for police
department mechanisms of accountability or prosecutorial action”).
87. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 86, at 81.
88. See Archbold, supra note 85, at 19; JAMES J. FYFE ET AL., POLICE ADMINISTRATION (5th
ed. 1997).
89. See text at Part IV.C.2 infra.
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3. Criminal Prosecution
Community activists have also sought to curb police misconduct by
encouraging criminal prosecution of officers guilty of criminal acts related to
excessive force or unjustified shootings. The reform strategy is based on the
expectation that successful conviction will both remove bad officers from the
police department and deter future misconduct by other officers.
Criminal prosecution has proven to be a notably weak instrument of
reform.90 Convictions of police officers are extremely difficult to obtain. Local
prosecutors, by the very nature of their role, have very close working
relationships with local police. On the federal level, the resources of the U.S.
Department of Justice are extremely limited, particularly in light of its general
mandate and the existence of over 16,000 local law enforcement agencies in
the United States.91 The legal standard, proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
the officer had criminal intent, is very difficult to meet. Officers can always
claim that they faced a threat to their own lives and were, therefore, justified in
using force. Also, judges, grand juries and petit juries are extremely deferential
to the claims of police officers that they were justified in taking the action they
did under the circumstances that prevailed. Even when successful, criminal
prosecution does not appear to deter future misconduct. Many officers have
been prosecuted and convicted in both New York City and Philadelphia over
the past three decades, and yet both departments are beset by continuing
controversies.
4. Summary
The judicial strategy has had very mixed success in terms of enhancing
police accountability. The Supreme Court has played a major role in
establishing the principle that the police will be held accountable to standards
of constitutional law and in stimulating a wide range of reforms. But even the
most enthusiastic supporters of an activist Court role concede that the federal
courts have, at best, a limited role as monitors of day-to-day police work. Both
tort litigation and criminal prosecution, meanwhile, have very poor records in
terms of achieving lasting improvements in policing.
C. The Legislative Strategy: External Oversight of the Police

90. See ALEXIS AGATHOCLEOUS, PROSECUTING POLICE MISCONDUCT 9 (1998); Monrad G.
Paulsen & Richard Bonnie, Securing Police Compliance with Constitutional Limitations, in THE
RULE OF LAW, at 405-407, (James F. Short, Jr. & Marvin E. Wolfgang eds., 1970); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 86, at 85-103.
91. MATTHEW J. HICKMAN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS 1999 (2001), www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/
lpd99.
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Community activists have also turned to the political arena in response to
police misconduct, demanding external oversight of the police. In a familiar
process known as “scandal and reform,”92 the exposure of police abuse
(corruption, excessive force, etc.) provides an opportunity to mobilize public
opinion and force elected officials to take some kind of corrective action.
External oversight has taken two different forms: one-time, “blue ribbon”
commissions and permanent, external oversight agencies to handle citizen
complaints against police officers.
1. “Blue Ribbon” Commissions
“Blue ribbon” commissions are a familiar feature of the American political
landscape. In response to a perceived social problem, chief executives at the
local, state, and national levels regularly appoint a panel of experts to
investigate the problem and prepare a report with a set of policy
recommendations. There is a long history of “riot commissions” appointed in
response to episodes of urban racial violence.93 There is also a long history of
blue ribbon commissions appointed in response to exposures of police
corruption or incidents of excessive force. The Christopher Commission
(1991), appointed in the wake of the Rodney King beating in Los Angeles, is
the most well-known, recent example, although police history is replete with
other examples.94
National-level, blue ribbon commissions have made important
contributions to American policing. The Wickersham Commission (1931),95
the President’s Crime Commission (1967),96 and the American Bar
Association Standards Relating to the Urban Police Function (1974)97
documented existing problems, defined minimum standards, and helped to set
reform agendas. Commissions at both the national and local levels, however,
suffer from one inherent weakness: they lack the capacity to implement their
92. LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, SCANDAL AND REFORM xvi-xvii (1978) (adopting phrase
“scandal and reform” to describe the process of exposing police abuse and the following
community reform efforts).
93. See THE POLITICS OF RIOT COMMISSIONS 1917-1970 3, 4-9 (Anthony Platt ed., 1971).
94. INDEP. COMM’N ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEP’T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (1991); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 86, at 44-46. The Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department is
also known as the Christopher Commission.
95. See NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 49, at 13839.
96. See THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 91-123 (1967); see also THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 245-46.
97. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE
FUNCTION (1974).
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own recommendations.98 By their very nature, commissions are temporary
bodies that disband once the final report is released. Reports typically lie on
the shelf with their recommendations unimplemented. (At best, these reports
become useful sources for academic studies of the police.) Implementation
depends upon a voluntary effort by the police department itself. In some
instances, the original scandal results in the appointment of a new police chief
who makes a sincere effort to implement the recommended reforms. Before
long, the political momentum for reform wanes, as the original crises fades
into memory and public attention, particularly the attention of the news media
moves on to new crises.99

98. See Samuel Walker, Setting the Standards: The Efforts and Impact of Blue-Ribbon
Commissions on the Police, in GELLER, supra note 52, at 354-70.
99. Events in Los Angeles in the decade of the 1990s offer one notable example of this
process. The original 1991 beating of Rodney King led to formation of the Christopher
Commission and the report that followed therefrom. See INDEP. COMM’N ON THE LAPD, supra
note 94. These events prompted two follow-up reports assessing implementation of the
recommendations. A few years later the Rampart scandal erupted, prompting three separate
reports and the Justice Department investigation that resulted in the current consent decree. A
notable exception to this general sequence, ironically in the Los Angeles area as well, is the series
of events related to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, starting with the Kolts Commission,
JAMES G. KOLTS, THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT (1992), and leading to
the creation of the permanent office of the Special Counsel, see infra notes 115-18 and
accompanying text.
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2. Citizen Oversight
a. The Citizen Oversight Movement100
A second legislative strategy for curbing police misconduct involves
creating a permanent external oversight agency to handle citizen complaints. In
the police-community relations crisis of the 1960s, the creation of “civilian
review boards” became one of the principal demands of civil rights groups.101
The movement for civilian review appeared to suffer a fatal blow, however,
with the demise of the independent Citizen Complaint Review Board (CCRB)
in New York City in 1966 and the Philadelphia Police Advisory Board (PAB)
in 1967.102 Then in the early 1970s, the movement quietly revived, gaining
momentum in the 1980s, and emerging as an established part of American
policing in the 1990s. Today, virtually all of the 50 largest cities are subject to
some form of citizen oversight, as are an increasing number of smaller cities
and county sheriffs’ departments.103
The reform strategy underlying citizen oversight assumes that police
departments are inherently unable to police themselves as a result of both
bureaucratic self-interest and the power of the police subculture. Citizen
oversight transfers responsibility for investigating citizen complaints to an
independent agency staffed by persons who are neither police officers nor
subject to the self-protective norms of the police subculture.
The major contribution of citizen oversight agencies involves establishing
the principle that the police should be answerable to the public through an
independent agency. The creation of external agencies, moreover, appears to
result in the filing of more complaints by citizens. The significance of this
phenomenon is discussed below.
b. The Limits of Citizen Oversight
The relative success of the citizen oversight movement in establishing
oversight agencies (albeit after a long and bitter struggle in virtually every city)
has left many of its advocates with a bitter taste, however. Many external
oversight agencies have been weak, ineffective, poorly led, and have not
provided either satisfactory service to individual complainants or had any

100. This article uses the term citizen oversight because it is more inclusive of the variety of
agencies that have developed in recent years. See WALKER, supra note 21, at 5.
101. Id. at 25-26.
102. ALGERNON D. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE POLICE 71-93, 208-15 (1968) (explaining
the brief history and quick demise of the New York City CCRB).
103. See WALKER, supra note 21 at 31-43 (discussing the revival and growth of citizen
oversight).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

24

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:3

scientifically measurable effect on police misconduct.104 The New York Civil
Liberties Union, for decades the leading advocate of citizen oversight in New
York City, has also been the leading critic of its child, the Civilian Complaint
Review Board (CCRB), issuing a series of reports on its shortcomings.105 A
recent report of a New Orleans Police-Civilian Review Task Force was highly
critical of the Office of Municipal Investigations (OMI) that has been in place
since 1981.106 An investigation of the Detroit police department found serious
accountability problems, despite the existence of a civilian-staffed office of
citizen complaints since 1973.107 Equally deep dissatisfaction has been
expressed by community activists in other cities with long-established citizen
oversight agencies, for example, in Portland, Oregon.108
External oversight agencies fail for a variety of reasons unrelated to the
underlying concept of citizen oversight. Some fail because they lack the
authority to accomplish their stated objectives: e.g., an agency promising
“independent” review of citizen complaints but not having power to conduct
such investigations.109 Others fail because of a lack of resources: e.g., not
having sufficient number of investigators relative to the size of the police
department and the complaint caseload.110 Some have suffered from poor
104. See id. at 44-45 (discussing publicized events that occurred in cities that were either
resistant to citizen oversight or where oversight clearly failed). A good review of several citizen
oversight agencies is found in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 86, at 123-383. There has
been little academic research evaluating the effectiveness of citizen oversight agencies. WALKER,
supra note 21 at 184-85. Only a handful of evaluations approach the accepted standards of
evaluation research. E.g., Wayne A. Kerstetter and Kenneth A. Rasinski, Opening a Window
into Police Internal Affairs: Impact of Procedural Justice Reform on Third-Party Attitudes, 7
SOC. JUST. RES. 107, 107-125 (1994) (studying the community’s perception of the Internal
Affairs Review Panel in Minneapolis).
105. N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FIVE YEARS OF CIVILIAN REVIEW (1998),
http://www.nyclu.org/fiveyears.html.
106. POLICE-CIVILIAN REVIEW TASK FORCE, DRAFT REPORT OF THE POLICE-CIVILIAN
REVIEW
TASK
FORCE
16
(2002),
http://www.new-orleans.la.us/home/reports/
policeCivilianTaskForce.php.
107. Merrick Bobb & Julio A. Thompson, The Detroit Police Department (Jan. 1997)
(unpublished report subsequently released by the Detroit Free Press). The first chapter of the
report, Introduction and Executive Summary, is available at http://www.freep.com/news/locway/
DPDReport1_29.htm.
108. See Portland Copwatch, 27 PEOPLE’S POLICE REPORT, August 2002, see also previous
PEOPLE’S POLICE REPORTS.
109. See WALKER, supra note 21, at 61-63 (discussing the different models of oversight
agencies and the meaning of “independence” in this context); Richard J. Terrill, Alternative
Perceptions of Independence in Civilian Oversight, 17 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 77, 79 (1990).
110. N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION FOUND., CIVILIAN REVIEW OF POLICING (1993) (providing
comparative data on staffing levels of review agencies) (on file with author). See in particular the
low level of staffing for the Cincinnati Office of Municipal Investigations, with only one
investigator for about 1,000 sworn officers.
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management.111 Others fail because of a lack of political support, disinterest
by police management, or staunch opposition from the local police union.112
An increasing number of observers argue that, even with sufficient powers
and resources, an oversight agency that focuses only on the investigation of
complaints will have little long-term impact on the overall quality of police
services in the field. First, the vast majority of citizen complaints are
“swearing contests,” without independent evidence to support either side.113
As a result, oversight agencies do not sustain a significantly higher rate of
complaints than internal police complaint procedures.114 Second, even the
strongest and most independent oversight agencies still have only the power to
advise police executives but not to impose discipline themselves. Third, even if
a significant number of complaints were to be sustained, there is no persuasive
evidence that this would have a deterrent effect on other officers. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, focusing on individual complaints tends to make
rank and file officers scapegoats for police misconduct when such misconduct
is the product of an organizational culture that permits it to exist. Recognizing
this latter point, a number of experts on oversight argue that oversight agencies
should focus on policies and procedures designed to change the underlying
organizational culture.
c. The Auditor Model: An Alternative Vision and Role for Citizen
Oversight
A small number of citizen oversight agencies, however, show promise for
making some significant, lasting contributions to police accountability.115 This
promise is found in the auditor model of oversight, which reflects a different
vision of the role of citizen oversight. The original idea of citizen oversight
saw its role narrowly focused on the investigation of individual citizen

111. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 86, at 259 (“[W]hen a Human Rights investigator
visited the OMI office on a weekday afternoon in late 1995, the office was absolutely silent, no
phones were ringing, and some staffers were playing computer video games.”). But c.f.
MAYORAL TRANSITION TASK FORCE ON THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, TASK FORCE
REPORT 7 (2002), http://www.nagintransition.com/task_force.html (The director of OMI “appears
to have developed a very professional office staff, to have the highest respect for her position, and
to recognize the importance of her office in terms of instilling public confidence in the City
government. There have been no complaints registered with OMI within the last two years about
the quality or the manner in which OMI has conducted its investigations.”).
112. See POLICE ADVISORY COMM’N, PHILADELPHIA, FISCAL YEAR 1997 ANN. REP. 2-3
(1997) (reporting litigation sponsored by the Fraternal Order of Police).
113. WALTER GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN: GOVERNMENTAL GRIEVANCE
PROCEDURES 191 (1966) (presenting the first serious discussion of this issue); see also WALKER,
supra note 21, at 121-37.
114. WALKER, supra note 21, at 137-38.
115. Id. at 34-40.
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complaints. The auditor model focuses on the police organization, seeking to
change policies and procedures in ways that will prevent future misconduct.
Policy Review. The most important auditing activity is the process known
as policy review. Under policy review, the investigation of complaints remains
the responsibility of the police department. The oversight agency reviews
complaints for the purpose of both identifying problems with the complaint
review process and also of identifying the underlying causes of complaints and
recommending the appropriate corrective action. Underlying causes may
include the lack of a departmental policy on particular kinds of situations, an
outdated or inadequate policy, or a lack of training for either the officer in
question or the department as a whole. Policy recommendations are not
binding. The chief may accept or reject them. The San Diego County Sheriff,
for example, has rejected a number of recommendations made by the Citizens
Law Enforcement Review Board.116
Several citizen oversight agencies maintain active policy review programs.
The San Francisco Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC) made a total of 11
policy recommendations in 1999 alone.117 The San Jose Independent Police
Auditor (IPA) made a total of 49 recommendations between 1993 and 2000,
only three of which were not adopted by the San Jose Police Department
(action on two others was still pending at the end of 2000). The policy
recommendations included such issues as the system for classifying citizen
complaints, procedures for addressing potential bias in the internal affairs unit,
a standardized investigation report, a process for notifying complainants about
the status of investigations, and others. These policy recommendations might
be seen as a form of organizational “house cleaning.” No single
recommendation is likely to result in significant improvements in policing, but
over time the sum total is likely to make the department more professional. In
short, the San Jose Independent Police Auditor focuses on organizational
change rather than the disposition of discrete complaints.118
The new Office of Independent Review (OIR) in the Los Angeles Sheriff’s
Department made seven policy recommendations in its first year of operation.
These included the development of a written policy on surveillance of drug

116. Memorandum from Thomas A. Zoll, Assistant Sheriff (Acting), to Sue Quinn, Exec.
Officer (Acting) of the Citizens Law Enforcement Review Board (Oct. 22, 1996), included in
Citizens Law Enforcement Review Board, San Diego, Special Meeting Minutes app. (Feb. 3,
1997) (on file with author).
117. OFFICE OF CITIZEN COMPLAINTS, SAN FRANCISCO, 1999 ANN. REP. (2000),
http://www.sfgov.org/occ/areport99/anr99_toc.htm.
118. OFFICE OF THE INDEP. POLICE AUDITOR, SAN JOSE, 2000 YEAR END REP. app. R at 8386 (2000), http://www.ci.san-jose.ca.us/ipa/reports/00/R%20-%20Recommendations.pdf; see also
WALKER, supra note 21, at 94-98.
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activities and guidelines to ensure high quality responses to civil claims against
the department.119
The OIR is the best example of the convergence of internal and external
accountability mechanisms. Established voluntarily by Sheriff Lee Baca, the
OIR is staffed by six attorneys and directed by a former U.S. Attorney, all of
whom are full-time employees of the LASD. The office functions as an
external auditor or monitor would, except that it is an internal accountability
mechanism.120 The Integrity and Accountability Office (IAO) in the
Philadelphia Police Department represents a similar approach: a non-sworn
investigator who is a full-time paid member of the department. An important
difference, however, is that the IAO was created as part of a consent decree
settling a suit alleging excessive force and race discrimination by the police
department, and does not represent a voluntary action by the department.121
To the extent that policy recommendations are adopted, they contribute to
the administrative rulemaking process. Policy review adds to the rulemaking
process by adding an outside perspective on police operations and also by
basing policy recommendations on specific complaints, which grounds them in
current operations. Even where recommendations are rejected, the policy
review process serves a number of important functions.122 First and most
important, it subjects the law enforcement agency to outside scrutiny and
represents an orderly process for public debate over its policies. In this respect
it creates the “transparency” that many experts feel is essential for building
and maintaining public trust. Second, the process has the long-term potential
for transforming the culture of a police organization by establishing the
principle that members of the department will be subject to regular outside
scrutiny and will be expected to conduct themselves in a professional
manner.123
The policy review process also involves a new perspective on citizen
complaints. Historically, police departments regarded them as a threat and
responded with an equally hostile attitude. Police complaint procedures were
decidedly not user friendly. In the policy review process, complaints are
regarded as valuable “social indicators” and as a “management tool;”
complaints are indicators of problems that police managers need to act on.124
For the same reason, in the new paradigm complaints become important data
119. OFFICE OF INDEP. REVIEW, supra note 36, at 31-53.
120. Id.
121. GREEN-CEISLER, supra note 36.
122. CITIZENS’ LAW ENFORCEMENT REVIEW BOARD, SAN DIEGO COUNTY, 2000 ANN. REP.
6 (2000), http://www.co.san-diego.ca.us/clerb/docs/00anl-rpt.pdf.
123. WALKER, supra note 21, at 149-57.
124. Drew Hyman, Citizen Complaints as Social Indicators: The Negative Feedback Model of
Accountability, 6 OMBUDSMAN J. 47 (1987).
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for the early intervention system (see below). And in this respect, the police
review process represents a merger between a traditional external reform
strategy (citizen oversight of the complaint process) and an internal reform
strategy (professional police management).
Arguably, the most successful auditor model of citizen oversight is the
Special Counsel to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD).125 It is
significant that the office of the Special Counsel was initially created as a
means of reducing the department’s costs for civil litigation.126 In light of the
previous discussion of the general failure of tort litigation as a reform strategy,
the Special Counsel stands as an important exception to the rule. Subsequent
reports of the Special Counsel have reported significant reductions in both the
number of civil suits filed against the department and the amount paid to
plaintiffs. As the semi-annual reports of the Special Counsel indicate, the
Special Counsel has taken an extremely broad interpretation of his mandate
and examined a wide range of departmental issues that could have some direct
or indirect impact on civil litigation. These issues include recruitment and
training practices, gender equity issues, gay and lesbian issues, as well as
issues related to the use of force and civil litigation.127
Perhaps the most notable example of the auditing process addressing
organizational issues is the Special Counsel’s investigation into the high rate of
shooting incidents among officers assigned to the Century Station. The
investigation found that the shooting rate was associated with a series of
management problems, including very young officers being supervised by very
young sergeants, a sergeant to officer ratio that violated the department’s own
guidelines, and a pervasive atmosphere that the station was an undesirable
assignment that officers wanted to leave as soon as possible. In short, the
problems in Century Station were not the result of a few “bad” officers but of
basic management practices. It follows that the reform strategies directed at
individual officers—tort litigation, criminal prosecution, citizen complaints—
are not likely to remedy these problems, while continued attention to
organizational issues through an auditing process is likely to achieve the
desired results.128

125. The Special Counsel’s web site is LOS ANGELES COUNTY, SPECIAL COUNSEL TO BOARD
SUPERVISORS, at http://lacounty.info/bobb/htm; see WALKER, supra note 21 (discussing role
of the Special Counsel).
126. LOS ANGELES COUNTY, supra note 125; KOLTS, supra note 99, at 352 (report prompted
creation of the Special Counsel’s office).
127. LOS ANGELES COUNTY, supra note 125.
128. See generally MERRICK J. BOBB ET AL., THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T,
9TH SEMIANNUAL REP. 7-34 (1998), http://lacounty.info/2ndShrfRpt.pdf; 15TH SEMIANNUAL,
supra note 33, at 9-35.
OF
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Community Outreach. A second role for citizen oversight agencies
involves community outreach. This includes making information about the
complaint process widely available throughout the community in the form of
brochures, posters, and appropriate public service announcements. Particularly
important is producing informational materials in languages other than
English, as appropriate to the local community. The Minneapolis Civilian
Review Authority (CRA), for example, issued brochures describing the
complaint process in eight languages other than English. The most recent
brochure is in Sudanese, a response to immigration patterns that have brought
perhaps 20,000 Sudanese to the Minneapolis community.129 The Portland,
Maine police department recently issued material about the department,
including the complaint process, in ten languages.130
An active community outreach program is designed to overcome the
traditionally closed nature of citizen complaint procedures in police
departments and is likely to generate a higher volume of complaints. As is
explained below, citizen complaints are an important element in the new
paradigm of police accountability, and their increased volume is not viewed
negatively. Complaints are defined as a management tool, indicators of
possible problems that supervisors should investigate. To be useful to
management, complaints are entered into an early intervention (EI) system
database that is used to track officer performance and identify potential
problem officers. The central role of an EI in the new paradigm of
accountability is discussed below.
D. Summary: Reform Strategies in Perspective
When viewed from the perspective of 100 years, past police reform efforts
have accomplished much. In 1900, American police departments were utterly
unprofessional, ineffective, inefficient, and corrupt. By the year 2000, police
departments had generally defined a sense of professional mission, adopted at
least the basics of modern management, raised personnel standards, and
embraced innovations such as community policing and problem-oriented
policing. Primarily through the intervention of the federal courts,
constitutionally based, minimal standards of lawful behavior have permeated
police work.

129. MINNEAPOLIS CIVILIAN POLICE REV. AUTHORITY, MINNEAPOLIS, IF YOU HAVE A
COMPLAINT AGAINST THE MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT (n.d.) (a brochure on file with
author).
130. Positive or Negative, in (Almost) Any Language, Portlanders Can Speak Their Minds
About Cops, L. ENFORCEMENT NEWS, June 15/30, 2001, http://www.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/len/2001/
06.30 (last visited Sep. 20, 2002).
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Despite these achievements, American policing still falls far short of the
ideal of genuine accountability. Across the country, departments are embroiled
in controversies over excessive use of force, race discrimination, and
corruption. While an increasing number of departments have taken significant
steps in the direction of establishing meaningful standards of accountability,
the majority falls far short of the ideal. In this context we can summarize the
shortcomings of the major reform strategies discussed above.
The professional management strategy, until compelled to do so by
external forces, failed to adopt policies and procedures that would shape the
behavior of officers on the street in a positive direction. While the Supreme
Court made a major contribution in terms of defining new standards of legality,
it left most police work ungoverned by any decision, and more importantly,
had little authority of its own to penetrate into the police organization and
shape officer behavior. Neither civil litigation nor criminal prosecution have
proven to be effective deterrents to police misconduct. Neither action
succeeded in penetrating the police organization and changing the police
subculture to the point of effective self-policing. Legislative strategies have
also fallen short. One-time, blue-ribbon commissions have no power to
implement their recommendations. Many citizen oversight agencies suffer
from structural weaknesses, a lack of resources, or poor leadership. No
research has demonstrated that oversight effectively reduces police
misconduct. Some agencies, adopting a different model of oversight, do exhibit
the promise of effecting long-term change.
Even in the face of significant past failure, several promising reform
strategies of the past provide the basis for the new paradigm of accountability.
The most important strategy is administrative rulemaking, a technique that
does reach deep into police departments and shapes officer behavior on the
street. The policy review process conducted by some citizen oversight
agencies, meanwhile, adds a new dimension to the rulemaking process.
Furthermore, improvements in the complaint process through community
outreach are likely to provide additional data for a departmental management.
The new paradigm takes these changes and integrates them into a
comprehensive accountability strategy.
V. THE NEW PARADIGM: PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER
The new paradigm of police accountability builds upon the more
promising reform measures discussed in the previous sections and both extends
and integrates them into a whole that is greater than the parts. Several features
characterize the new paradigm. First, it integrates otherwise discrete policies
and procedures into a comprehensive accountability program. Thus, three
elements of the new paradigm—use-of-force reports, citizen complaints, and
traffic stop data—become the raw material for an early intervention system,
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which is the linchpin of the new paradigm. Second, it relies on the systematic
collection and analysis of data on police department performance for the
purpose of identifying problems that can be addressed through official
intervention. Third, the official intervention represents a proactive approach to
reducing officer misconduct that is fundamentally different from the traditional
reactive approach in which the department responds after an incident has
occurred. The following section reviews the components of the new paradigm
and examines their respective roles in the new paradigm.
A.

Early Intervention Systems
1. The Concept of Early Intervention Systems

Early intervention (EI) systems are the linchpin of the new paradigm of
police accountability, and for that reason are discussed first.131 A relatively
new development in police administration, EI systems are data-driven
management information systems designed to help identify potential problem
officers and then to provide those officers with some official intervention—
usually counseling or training—designed to improve their performance. The
intervention is separate from the normal disciplinary system and is informal in
the sense that no documentation appears in an officer’s personnel record. This
informality gives supervisors greater flexibility in addressing performance
issues that do not yet warrant formal disciplinary action, which would, in turn,
trigger all of the formal requirements of a department’s disciplinary process
and a collective bargaining agreement if one is in effect.132
The concept of EI systems is based on evidence indicating that in any law
enforcement agency a small number of officers are involved in a
disproportionate percentage of problematic incidents, such as citizen
complaints, use-of-force incidents, civil suits against the department, and other
indicators of performance problems.133 Traditionally, these officers have been
known to most other rank and file officers as well as many supervisors, but
police departments took no action to correct their behavior.134

131. Livingston, supra note 19, at 846 (quoting “the concept of early warning is central to
both [the Pittsburgh and Steubenville] consent decrees . . .”). This author prefers the term “early
intervention” (“EI”) to the more commonly used “early warning” because the latter term has a
negative, punishment-oriented tone, focused on “problem” officers. EI systems, however, are
evolving in the direction of comprehensive personnel assessment systems for the purpose of
assisting a wider range of officers. See EARLY INTERVENTION, supra note 22.
132. Early Warning, supra note 22, at 1.
133. Sean P. Murphy, Wave of Abuse Claims Laid to a Few Officers, BOSTON GLOBE,
October 4, 1992, at Metro/Region 1; Don Terry, Kansas City Police Go After Their Own “Bad
Boys”, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1991, at A1.
134. HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY, 171 (1977).
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An EI system consists of four basic components. The first involves the
officer performance indicators that are entered into the data base: use-of-force
reports, citizen complaints, involvement in civil suits, use of sick leave,
resisting arrest charges, and so on. The second component involves the process
by which the data are analyzed and certain officers selected for intervention.135
The third component consists of the departmental intervention with those
officers selected, usually in the form of counseling by supervisors, retraining,
or referral to professional counseling. The fourth component consists of the
follow-up monitoring to determine whether or not an officer’s performance has
improved.136
The one evaluation of EI systems to date, a study of three big city police
departments that was published by the National Institute for Justice, found that
the EI systems were effective in reducing citizen complaints and use-of-force
incidents among officers subject to intervention. The evaluation also concluded
that EI systems have potentially broader impact than just on individual
officers. If implemented properly, they can redefine the role of first-line
supervisors (principally sergeants) by providing them with both the direction
and the tools (systematic data on officer performance) to intervene at an early
stage with officers whose performance indicates problems in dealing
effectively with citizens. At the departmental level, meanwhile, the evaluation
suggests that an EI system database provides a comprehensive overview of
agency performance and has the capacity to identify units with high levels of
unacceptable performance.137
There is preliminary evidence that an EI system has the potential for
transforming the organizational culture of a police department and raising
standards of accountability.138 This transformation is a product of several
aspects of an EI system and its impact on supervisors. First, an EI system
database gives sergeants systematic data on officers’ performance, thereby
strengthening their hand when dealing with an officer who is having problems
on the street. A sergeant can cite the data to rebut an officer’s claim that he or
she is being singled out as a result of bias or personality factors. A survey of

135. The best description of this phase of an EI system is in 15TH SEMIANNUAL, supra note
33, at 37-70. The proper thresholds are a matter of much debate at present. EARLY
INTERVENTION, supra note 22.
136. EARLY INTERVENTION, supra note 22 (lists four components of an early warning
system). The earlier work, Early Warning, supra note 22, at 2, lists only three components of an
early warning system.
137. See Early Warning, supra note 22, at 3-6.
138. The operative words here are “preliminary” and “potential.” The author makes no claim
that there is independently verified evidence that the transformation has, in fact, occurred in any
one police department.
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police managers experienced with EI systems reported many positive
comments regarding use of the EI system in this manner.139
Second, and perhaps even more important, an EI system has the potential
for enhancing the accountability of sergeants. EI systems have the technical
capacity for documenting the extent to which a sergeant utilizes the system.
The more sophisticated systems literally record the number of times sergeants
log on to the system. Documented failure to access the system can be grounds
for an unsatisfactory performance evaluation of the sergeant. Additionally, the
EI database has the capacity to document comparative levels of problematic
officer performance among sergeants, thereby identifying sergeants who may
be failing to utilize the system effectively, or who may be conducting
inadequate supervision
Whether or not the potential of EI systems is realized is a crucial question.
The NIJ evaluation of EI systems concluded that a system cannot be separated
from the larger climate of accountability in a department. If there is no serious
commitment to accountability on the part of the chief executive and the top
command, even the best EI system is likely to be nullified by a hostile
organizational culture. Conversely, where there is a commitment to
accountability, an EI system is likely to reinforce other accountability
mechanisms.140
2. Early Intervention Systems and the New Paradigm
An EI system is the linchpin of the new paradigm because it serves as the
central repository of the data contained in the use-of-force reports, citizen
complaints, and traffic stop data. And for precisely this reason it is essential
that a department have a comprehensive use-of-force reporting system, an open
and accessible complaint system, and a traffic stop data collection program.
For an EI system to work effectively, it needs to capture as broad a range of
officer performance indicators as possible. A “problem” officer, for example,
may not necessarily have a large number of citizen complaints, and thus would
not be identified by that indicator alone. But that same officer may well have a
number of incidents in a number of different indicators (complaints, use of
force incidents, resisting arrest charges, etc.), a pattern that suggests a general
problem of dealing effectively with the public.
EI systems are mandated by all of the consent decrees and memoranda of
understanding between the United States and various local law enforcement
agencies. They are referred to by different terms: an Early Warning System
(EWS) in Pittsburgh;141 a Management Awareness Program (MAP) for the
139. See Early Warning, supra note 22.
140. Id. at 5-6.
141. Pittsburgh Decree, supra note 6, at para. 12.
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New Jersey State Police;142 the Training Evaluation and Management System
(or TEAMS II) in Los Angeles;143 the Personnel Performance Management
System (PPMS) in Washington, D.C.;144 and the Risk Management System
(RMS) in Cincinnati.145 The differences in terminology are irrelevant, as all
embody the basic elements of the EI system concept. There are variations with
regard to the performance indicators that are to be included in each EI system.
The Pittsburgh decree mandates fourteen indicators; the Cincinnati decree, ten;
and the Los Angeles decree, seventeen. These variations in the number of
indicators are not crucial (as long as there is not just one or even just three
indicators). There is at present no consensus among experts regarding exactly
how many indicators should be used, and there are differences of opinion
regarding other specifics of an ideal EI system. EI systems are a relatively new
concept, and professional thinking about the best design is still developing.146
B.

Use-of-Force Reporting
1. Use-of-Force Policies and Investigations

Use-of-force reporting is one of the core elements of the new paradigm.
The Justice Department report, Principles for Promoting Police Integrity
recommends: “Agencies should develop use of force policies that address use
of firearms and other weapons and particular use of force issues such as: firing
at moving vehicles, verbal warnings, positional asphyxia, bar arm restraints,
and the use of chemical agents.”147 The provisions of the various consent
decrees address four separate issues related to police officer use of force:
substantive use-of-force policy, incident reporting requirements, the
investigation of force incidents, and entry of force reports into a departmental
early intervention (EI) or risk management system. All police departments
have some formal use-of-force policy, with a reporting requirement. The
consent decrees and memoranda of understanding generally refine and extend
those policies. Provisions related to the investigation of force incidents are an
important innovation, and the requirements related to an early intervention
system are the most important of all.
With regard to substantive use-of-force policy, the consent decrees and
memoranda of understanding vary, reflecting the specific problems of each
department. The Pittsburgh decree requires a complete overhaul of the

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

N.J. Decree, supra note 7, at para. 40.
L.A. Decree, supra note 8, at para. 39.
D.C. MEMORANDUM, supra note 9, at para. 106.
CINCINNATI MEMORANDUM, supra note 2, at § VII.A.
EARLY INTERVENTION, supra note 22.
PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at § I.2.
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department’s policy, directing the City to “develop and implement a use of
force policy that is in compliance with applicable law and current professional
standards.”148 The Memorandum of Understanding with the Washington, D.C.
police contains a similar requirement.149 The Cincinnati Memorandum of
Agreement, meanwhile, mandates clarifications of the existing use-of-force
policy and has specific provisions severely limiting deployment of the canine
unit, and the use of chokeholds and chemical spray.150 The latter provisions are
significant because they bring under the ambit of “force” policy such actions as
deployment of the canine unit. The Los Angeles decree, however, does not call
for changes in the substantive use-of-force policy but does require a number of
procedural changes regarding enforcement of the existing policy.151 All of the
decrees require that officers report all enumerated force incidents. The
significant aspect of the use-of-force reports is that they are required to be
entered into an early intervention system.
With respect to enforcement, the provisions of the Los Angeles consent
decree are notable for their attention to operational details. First, use-of-force
investigations are centralized in the Operations Headquarters Bureau (OHB), a
change that separates investigators from the units where the officer under
investigation is assigned.152 Second, the OHB is required to have the capacity
to “roll out” (i.e., respond immediately to any incident) 24 hours a day.153 Useof-force incidents are to be immediately reported to OHB, the chief of police,
the Police Commission, and the Inspector General.154 The department is
mandated to negotiate with the police union to secure a requirement that in the
case of shootings involving more than one officer, each officer be represented
by a different attorney.155 All officers and witnesses are to be “separated
immediately” after a shooting incident.156 Finally, investigators are required to
evaluate the effect of the presence or non-presence of a supervisor at each useof-force incident and service of a search warrant.157
148. Pittsburgh Decree, supra note 6, at para. 13.
149. D.C. MEMORANDUM, supra note 9, at para. 37 (“MPD shall complete development of a
Use of Force Policy that complies with applicable law and current professional standards. The
policy shall emphasize the goal of de-escalation and shall encourage officers to use advisements,
warnings, and verbal persuasion when appropriate. The policy shall advise that the use of
excessive force shall subject officers to discipline and possible criminal prosecution and/or civil
liability.”).
150. CINCINNATI MEMORANDUM, supra note 2, at § IV.A.12(b),(c),(f), B.14(b), C.20(a)-(h).
151. L.A. Decree, supra note 8 at § at III, paras. 55-105.
152. Id. at § III.A, paras. 55-69.
153. Id. at para. 56.
154. Id.
155. Id. at para. 60.
156. Id. at para. 61.
157. Id. at para. 62.
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These decree provisions are designed to correct specific problems in useof-force investigations. Investigations have been compromised by too intimate
a relationship between investigators and officers, a failure of the department to
respond to force incidents in a timely fashion (which may result in the loss of
witnesses or physical evidence), the failure to report incidents to the top
command or other authorities, the collusion of officers for the purpose
agreeing on a common and exculpatory version of the incident, and the lack of
supervisory attention to critical incidents.
The significance of these decree provisions is that, as an exercise in
administrative rulemaking, they move beyond formal policy and attempt to
ensure the integrity of the investigative process. Several informed
commentators argue that the problem in the LAPD has been not the substantive
use-of-force policy, but the failure of the department to enforce that policy.
The LAPD’s own Board of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Incident lists thirtyone formal policies and procedures designed to ensure integrity within the
department.158 A separate report written by the noted legal scholar Erwin
Chemerinsky concludes that the problem within the LAPD is “the culture of
the Los Angeles Police Department, which gives rise to and tolerated what
occurred in the Rampart Division and elsewhere.”159
Failures to enforce existing use-of-force policies have been found in other
police departments.160 The first monitor’s report in Philadelphia, for example,
found that “rigidity of procedure and routine failure to follow leads or take
obvious measures, and a tendency to view the case only from the officer’s
perspective, result in too many inadequate investigations.”161 The 1992 Kolts
report on the Los Angeles Sheriffs’ Department found “explicit and implicit
biases against civilian complainants at every level of the complaint process.”162
These problems included investigations being conducted by the supervisor of
the officer under investigation, with resulting evidence of bias, investigations
being “closed before completion—at times under highly suspicious
circumstances,” and complaints that, although “corroborated by physical
evidence and independent witnesses, are frequently not sustained.”163 The
Cincinnati Memorandum of Understanding attempts to improve the integrity of
investigations by requiring that officers notify their supervisors after any use of
158. BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO THE RAMPART AREA CORRUPTION INCIDENT, LOS ANGELES
POLICE DEPARTMENT, PUBLIC REPORT 291-298 (2000).
159. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at § I.
160. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 86, at 74-76 (reporting problems in Los Angeles
and other cities).
161. Plaintiffs’ First Monitoring Report at 15, NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, No. 96-cv6045 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1997) (on file with author).
162. KOLTS, supra note 99, at 100.
163. Id.
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force, that supervisors respond to the scene [presumably immediately]; that the
Internal Investigations Section respond to the scene of “serious” force
incidents and all canine bites that cause injury or require hospitalization, that
investigators neither ask “leading questions,” nor give an “automatic
preference for an officer’s statement over a non-officer’s statement, nor . . .
disregard a witness’s statement merely because the witness has some
connection to the complainant.”164
The provisions of the Cincinnati Memorandum of Agreement related to the
canine unit also address operational details. They require the department to
revise its policy on the deployment of canines to limit “off-leash”
deployments; to require officers to gain approval from an immediate
supervisor prior to any deployment; to announce “loud and clear” to the
suspect that a canine deployment is imminent; to prohibit bites by canines
except “where the suspect poses a risk of imminent danger” (e.g., injury), and
to call off the dog “at the first possible moment.”165 Additionally, written
reports are required of all canine deployments and these reports are to be
entered into the risk management system.166
With respect to canine unit deployment, the Memorandum of Agreement
with the Washington, D.C., police department requires similar reforms.167 On
the contrary, the Los Angeles consent decree does not address substantive
policy related to the canine unit but does require that all bite incidents (but not
mobilizations) be entered into the EI system.168
One particularly notable aspect of the Cincinnati Memorandum of
Agreement is that all revisions to use of force policies proposed by the
department are to be submitted to the Community Council “for their review,
comment and education.”169 This requirement, which is not found in other
decrees and memoranda, is designed to overcome the closed and insular
organizational culture of the Cincinnati police department.
2. Use of Force Policies and the New Paradigm
The provisions of the consent decrees related to the use of force essentially
adopted the established principle of administrative rulemaking, and in that
respect do not represent any significant departure with respect to
accountability. In two other respects, however, they represent something new
and important. First, they extend the rulemaking principle into the area of force

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

CINCINNATI MEMORANDUM, supra note 2, at § V.B, paras. 26-29.
Id. at § IV.C, para. 20.
Id.
D.C. MEMORANDUM, supra note 9, at paras. 44-46.
L.A. Decree, supra note 8, at § II.A, para. 41(b).
CINCINNATI MEMORANDUM, supra note 2, at § IV.A, para. 13.
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investigations. Previous reform efforts have generally focused their attention
on substantive use-of-force policy, often merely requiring that a department
have a policy, and completely neglecting the department’s enforcement
process. The law enforcement accreditation standards, for example, require
none of the enforcement procedures found in the Los Angeles and Cincinnati
decrees.170 Livingston astutely comments that the Commission on
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), the national
accreditation agency, “has largely refrained from specifying the content of
policies required in particular areas. . . .”171 Second and more important, force
incident reports are entered into the early intervention system. The use-of-force
reports are not a discrete aspect of police accountability but are integrated into
a system that relates use of force to other areas of officer performance. The
result is, at least potentially, a comprehensive approach to accountability,
involving many different indicia (e.g., use of force, citizen complaints, traffic
stops).
C. Citizen Complaint Process
1. An Open and Accessible Complaint Procedure
The provisions of the consent decrees and memoranda of understanding
related to citizen complaint procedures seek to enhance the openness and
accessibility of those procedures.
This goal is consistent with the
recommendation provided in the Justice Department report, Principles for
Promoting Police Integrity, which suggests police departments “should
provide a readily accessible process in which community and agency members
can have confidence that complaints against agency actions and procedures
will be given prompt and fair attention.”172
As a first step, the decrees expand the ways in which citizens can file
complaints. The Los Angeles decree, for example, requires that the department
accept complaints “in writing or verbally, in person, by mail, by telephone (or
TDD), facsimile transmission, or by electronic mail.”173 And in an even more
significant change, the LAPD must also accept anonymous complaints.174
Similar complaint filing procedures are required by the consent decree related

170. COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, STANDARDS FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES §1.3.7 (4th ed., 1998).
171. Livingston, supra note 19, at 844.
172. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at § II(1).
173. L.A. Decree, supra note 8, at § III.C, para. 74(a).
174. Id. at para. 74(b).
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to the New Jersey State Police175 and the Memorandum of Agreement with the
Washington, D.C., police.176
To open up the complaint process, the New Jersey consent decree requires
that officers carry both “fact sheets and complaint forms in their vehicles at all
times while on duty.”177 Moreover, officers are required to inform citizens that
they “have a right to make a complaint” if they are not happy with how they
have been treated. Officers are also explicitly forbidden from discouraging
citizens from making complaints.178 Finally, officers are required to “provide
their name and identification number to any civilian who requests it.”179 With
respect to community outreach, the decree requires: “The State Police shall
develop and implement an effective program to inform civilians that they may
make complaints or provide other feedback regarding the performance of any
state trooper.”180 This includes the development of informational materials
describing the complaint process in both English and Spanish.181
Equally important are detailed provisions related to the investigation of
citizen complaints. These provisions closely parallel those related to use-offorce investigations and are designed to ensure that investigations are thorough
and fair.182 The LAPD, for example, is required to record either by audio or
video tape the interviews with all complainants, involved officers, and
witnesses.183 This is a practice that has recently emerged in the field of citizen
oversight and permits quality control checks of investigations by citizen
oversight auditors, for example, who review tapes to identify incomplete or
biased interviews.184 LAPD investigators are also directed to canvass the
scene of a complaint incident to locate both physical evidence and potential
witnesses.185 Also, attempts should be made to interview complainants and
witnesses “at sites and times convenient for them.”186

175. N.J. Decree, supra note 7, at paras. 57-60.
176. D.C. MEMORANDUM, supra note 9, at paras. 92-93.
177. N.J. Decree, supra note 7, at para. 59.
178. Id.
179. Id. at para. 57.
180. Id. at Para. 58.
181. Id.
182. Generally, use of force investigations are internally initiated while citizen complaint
investigations are generated by external complaint. See D.C. MEMORANDUM, supra note 9, at
paras. 56-59, 61, 68, 72; L.A. Decree, supra note 8, at paras. 55-59, 67-68.
183. L.A. Decree, supra note 8, at § III.D, para. 80(a).
184. POLICE INTERNAL INVESTIGATION AUDITING COMMITTEE CITIZEN ADVISORS,
PORTLAND, FOURTH QUARTER 1995 MONITORING REPORT 3, 5, 10 (1996) (on file with author);
WALKER, supra note 21, at 169-70.
185. L.A. Decree, supra note 8, at § III.D, para. 80(b).
186. Id.
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Finally, the consent decrees and memoranda of understanding contain
provisions related to the disposition of complaints. The Washington, D.C.,
Memorandum of Agreement requires that the “MPD shall continue to make
findings based on a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard.”187 While some
citizen oversight agencies have adopted formal standards for evaluating the
evidence in complaints, many have not, and it is widely believed that most
police departments have no formal standards. Additionally, the “MPD shall
consider all relevant evidence including circumstantial, direct, and physical
evidence, as appropriate, and make credibility determinations, if feasible.” And
particularly important, “[t]here shall be no automatic preference for an
officer’s statement over a person’s statement.”188 This is a particularly
important rule since one of the major problems with police department
complaint investigations has been the practice of discrediting citizen testimony
and giving a preference to officers’ statements.
The Collaborative Agreement in Cincinnati goes much further than any of
the other agreements or decrees in restructuring citizen complaint agencies,
requiring the city to consolidate the two existing citizen complaint procedures
into a single Citizen Complaint Authority (CCA).189 At the time of the decree,
Cincinnati had both a Citizens Police Review Board, with limited power to
investigate complaints, and an Office of Municipal Investigation with formal
authority to investigate complaints.190 The new CCA mandated by the consent
decree will have a full-time executive director and five professional
investigators. If nothing else, this consolidation ends the ambiguity
surrounding conflicting jurisdiction over complaints.
In an important step, the decree directs: “as a condition of employment, all
police officers and city employees are required to provide truthful and accurate
information to the CCA.”191 The issue of officer cooperation with citizen
oversight agencies has been a major controversy. Through their unions, rank
187.
188.
189.
190.

D.C. MEMORANDUM, supra note 9, at para. 98.
Id. at para. 99.
CINCINNATI MEMORANDUM, supra note 2, at § VI.D, para. 51.
See CITIZENS POLICE REVIEW PANEL, CINCINNATI, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
CITIZENS POLICE REVIEW PANEL (2001) (on file with author). A similar situation currently exists
in Pittsburgh. The more recent report of the court appointed monitor primarily criticized the
Office of Municipal Investigations for its deficiencies in handling complaints, as opposed to the
police department. “Problems within the OMI process are deeply disturbing to the auditor,
particularly in light of the fact that the City is 18 quarters into a 20-quarter process. The
problems within OMI are even more disturbing because many of them have appeared despite
concerns expressed by the auditor in 1998, 1999, and 2000 about OMI processes.” Auditor’s
Eighteenth Quarterly Report at 74, United States v. Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354 (W.D. Pa. filed for
quarter ending Feb. 16, 2002), http://archive.aclu.org/issues/policepractices/Pittsburgh_AQR/
18AQR.pdf.
191. Collaborative Agreement, supra note 2, at para. 68.
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and file officers have bitterly fought granting oversight agencies subpoena
power. The lack of officer cooperation has been a major impediment to citizen
oversight across the country since it denies the agency one of the most crucial
sources of information.192 The provision of the Cincinnati Agreement
requiring cooperation is a significant step toward improving citizen oversight.
2. Citizen Complaints and the New Paradigm
The changes in citizen complaint procedures mandated by the consent
decrees and memoranda of understanding have three important effects with
respect to the new paradigm of police accountability. First, for all practical
purposes they initiate the development of a formal set of professional standards
for citizen complaint procedures. At present, no such standards have been
promulgated by law enforcement professional associations, the Commission on
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA),193 or the two citizen
oversight professional associations: the National Association for Civilian
Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE)194 or the International Association
for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (IACOLE).195 A number of citizen
oversight agencies have developed their own detailed rules and procedures, as
have many police departments, but these are locally-initiated efforts without
reference to any national standards.196 As Livingston observed in an initial
comment on § 14141 litigation, the law “may have the beneficial effect of
further stimulating the articulations and dissemination of national standards
governing core police managerial responsibilities.”197
Second, changes that make a complaint procedure more accessible are
likely to result in more complaints filed by citizens, either because there are
more convenient ways to file complaints or because citizens are likely to have
greater confidence in the process.198 An increase in complaints provides
additional data for the departmental EI system, thereby enhancing its capacity
to identify problem officers.
192. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 86, at 68-71; INDEP. COMM’N ON THE LOS
ANGELES POLICE DEP’T, supra note 94, at 168-71.
193. COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, supra note 170, at
ch. 52.
194. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT,
INVESTIGATION, MONITORING AND REVIEW OF COMPLAINTS, at http://www.nacole.org/
investigative%20guidelines.html.
195. IACOLE is now a non-functioning organization. Its activities have essentially been
subsumed by NACOLE.
196. See OFFICE OF THE COMMUNITY OMBUDSMAN, BOISE, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, ch.
2 (2001), www.boiseombudsman.org/PoliciesProcedures2001.pdf; WALKER, supra note 21, at
188-97 (example of a model citizen complaint procedure).
197. Livingston, supra note 19, at 843.
198. Walker, supra note 21, at 121-37.
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Third, the role of citizen complaints in the new paradigm represents a
merger of internal and external mechanisms of accountability that historically
have been seen as polar opposites. Civil rights activists have pursued the
creation of external citizen oversight agencies in the belief that internal
mechanisms are inherently incapable of effectively investigating complaints
and disciplining guilty officers. In the new paradigm a reformed citizen
complaint process that is more open and accessible provides data that, along
with use-of-force reports and other performance data, are an important part of
an EI system. It should be noted that the entry of citizen complaint data into an
EI database occurs (or should occur) even where an independent, external
citizen oversight agency has original jurisdiction over complaints; this is so
because the records of complaint are such an important tool for management of
the police department.
D. Traffic Stop Data Collection
1. The Racial Profiling Controversy
Collection of data on traffic stops is another element of the new paradigm.
Data collection is a response to allegations of racial profiling, defined as the
police practice of stopping drivers on the basis of race or ethnicity rather than
bona fide traffic law violations.199 The Justice Department report, Principles
for Promoting Police Integrity, recommends: “[L]aw enforcement officers
should report data to their agency on each traffic stop, including information
on the race, ethnicity, and gender of the person(s) stopped.”200 The report
observes that systematic data “can shift the debate surrounding racial profiling
from anecdotal reports to a more informed discussion about the appropriate
allocation of police resources.”201 For all practical purposes, traffic stop data
collection is essentially a variation on the theme of use-of-force reporting. In
both cases, the department requires officers to complete reports on citizen
contacts that are potentially problematic. The new paradigm, in fact, can help
to resolve the major problem now facing traffic stop data collection efforts.
Traffic stop data collection has been the principal demand of civil rights
groups as a remedy for racial profiling.202 Despite bitter opposition from the

199. DRIVING WHILE BLACK, supra note 23; PROFILES, supra note 23; DEBORAH RAMIREZ
A RESOURCE GUIDE ON RACIAL PROFILING DATA COLLECTION SYSTEMS 3 (2000),
www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/bja/184768.pdf; POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, RACIALLY
BIASED POLICING 121-122 (2001), http://www.policeforum.org/racial.html#7.
200. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at § 4.
201. Id.
202. Leland Ware, Prohibiting Racial Profiling: The ACLU’s Orchestration of the Missouri
Legislation, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 59, 61 (2003).
ET AL.,
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police and their political allies,203 several states have enacted laws requiring
some or all their agencies to collect data, and a large number of departments
have undertaken voluntary data collection efforts.204 The San Diego, California
police department is generally believed to have been the first to undertake a
voluntary effort, and was soon followed by the San Jose, California police
department.205 The first reports from these departments are currently available,
as are reports from a number of other data collection efforts.206
2. Problems with Analyzing Traffic Stop Data
The assumption underlying the demand for traffic stop data collection is
that the data will reveal whether or not an illegal pattern of discrimination
based on race or ethnicity exists. This assumption has proven to be somewhat
naive, and both criminologists and law enforcement professionals have found
the interpretation of traffic stop data to be an extremely complicated
undertaking.207 While virtually all of the official traffic stop data reports to date
reveal racial and ethnic disparities in drivers stopped, they do not necessarily
prove that the disparities represent discrimination. The controversy turns on
the question of what should serve as the proper benchmark or denominator for
the data on drivers stopped. In the initial lawsuits alleging racial profiling the
plaintiffs presented observational data on the racial composition of all drivers
and of observed traffic law violators on the highways in question.208 The
official reports published to date, however, use official population data by race
and ethnicity as the denominator. Thus, for example, the San Jose Police

203. Heather MacDonald, The Myth of Racial Profiling, 11 CITY JOURNAL 18-19, 26-27
(2001); See POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 199 (acknowledging the problem
of discrimination but opposing data collection and recommending other remedies).
204. See LAWS AND POLICIES, at http://www.profilesininjustice.com/laws.html (current data
on this area of law maintained by Professor David Harris).
205. See Paul Van Slambrouck, Two cities tackle racial profiling, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Mar. 29, 1999, http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/1999/03/29/fp2s1-csm.shtml.
206. See generally SAN JOSE POLICE DEP’T, VEHICLE STOP DEMOGRAPHIC STUDY ANNUAL
REPORT:
ISSUED
DECEMBER
1,
2000
(2000),
http://www.sjpd.org/sjpd%20vehicle%20stop%20annual%20rpt.pdf; SAN DIEGO POLICE DEP’T,
VEHICLE STOP STUDY: MID-YEAR REPORT (2000); MO. ATT’Y GEN. OFFICE, ANNUAL REP. ON
2001 MISSOURI TRAFFIC STOPS (2001), available at http://www.ago.state.mo.us/
rpexecsummary2001.htm.
207. Samuel Walker, Searching for the Denominator: Problems with Police Traffic Stop Data
and an Early Warning System Solution, 3 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 63, 65-67 (2001); GEN. ACCT.
OFFICE, UNITED STATES, GGD-00-41, RACIAL PROFILING: LIMITED DATA AVAILABLE ON
MOTORISTS STOPS (2000), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/gg00041.pdf; MVA & JOEL MILLER,
PROFILING POPULATIONS AVAILABLE FOR STOPS AND SEARCHES (Home Office, Police Research
Series Paper 131, Carole F. Willis ed., 2000).
208. DRIVING WHILE BLACK, supra note 23.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

44

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:3

Department found that Hispanics represented forty-three percent of all traffic
stops but only thirty-one percent of the population of the city.209
Many experts question whether population data are the proper denominator
because they do not represent those drivers who are “at risk” for a traffic
stop.210 There are believed to be significant variations by race and ethnicity in
the driving age population and actual driving patterns (both in terms of average
miles driven and also illegal driving behavior). Also, particular areas
experience a significant number of non-resident drivers not represented in the
census data.211 Observational data on actual drivers, such as was submitted in
the early racial profiling lawsuits in New Jersey and Maryland,212 solves these
problems, but such data collection efforts are extremely expensive and have
not been used in official reports released to date.213 Consequently, these reports
do not answer the question of whether a pattern of race discrimination exists.
3. Traffic Stop Data and the New Paradigm
The author of this article has argued that an early intervention system
offers a practical solution to the problem of analyzing traffic stop data.214
Officers complete reports on each traffic stop, and these reports are entered
into the EI system database. The denominator then becomes the traffic stop
activity of officers working comparable assignments. In theory, all patrol (or
traffic unit) officers working a particular assignment should make roughly the
same number of traffic stops. An analysis of the data can identify officers who
stop a disproportionate number of African-American or Hispanic drivers.
Further analysis can determine whether these officers’ activities warrant
official intervention. At the same time, the analysis can identify officers who,
contrary to departmental expectations, engage in no traffic stop enforcement,
devote too much effort to traffic enforcement, or who stop a disproportionate
number of female drivers.215
Traffic stop data collection is a central component in the consent decree
with the State of New Jersey for the obvious reason that racial profiling was

209. SAN JOSE POLICE DEP’T, supra note 206, at 5-8.
210. Walker, supra note 207, at 79; MILLER, supra note 207, at 83.
211. See the effort to develop more refined denominators in David A. Harris, The Stories, The
Statistics, and The Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 284-85
(1999).
212. See PROFILES, supra note 23 (discussing these cases and the data presented therein).
213. SAN JOSE POLICE DEP’T, supra note 206, at 14-15; MO ATT’Y GEN. OFFICE, supra note
206.
214. Walker, supra note 207, at 64.
215. SAMUEL WALKER AND DAWN IRLBECK, “DRIVING WHILE FEMALE”: A NATIONAL
PROBLEM IN POLICE MISCONDUCT (2002), available at http://www.policeaccountability.org/
drivingfemale.htm.
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the principal basis of the Justice Department suit. The decree requires the
collection of data on nineteen separate items, including, most importantly, the
name and ID number of the officer, the gender and race of drivers and
passengers, frisks and searches, and ultimate disposition of the stop.216 The
Pittsburgh consent decree requires:
The City shall develop, and require all officers to complete, a written report
each time a PBP officer makes a traffic stop. The record shall include the
officer’s name and badge number; the race and gender of the individual
searched or stopped; approximate time and location; whether the stop involved
a frisk or pat-down search; any weapons, evidence, or contraband found during
the search; whether the individual involved was arrested or cited, and if so, the
charges.217

The Los Angeles decree requires the collection of ten items related to motor
vehicle stops and nine items related to pedestrian stops.218
It should be noted that the consent decrees and memoranda of
understanding require the identification of officers making a traffic stop. This
is an extremely important issue because rank and file officers have bitterly
opposed officer identification and have generally succeeded in preventing that
from being included in data collection statutes or voluntary department
216. N.J. Decree, supra note 7, at para.29 (listing as information required to be collected
concerning traffic stops: “1. name and identification number of trooper(s) who initiated the stop;
2. name and identification number of trooper(s) who actively participated in the stop; 3. date,
time, and location of the stop; 4. time at which the stop commenced and at which it ended; 5.
license number/state of stopped vehicle; 5A. description of stopped vehicle; 6. the gender and
race/ethnicity of the driver, and the driver’s date of birth if known; 7. the gender and
race/ethnicity of any passenger who was requested to exit the vehicle, frisked, searched, requested
to consent to a vehicle search, or arrested; 8. whether the driver was issued a summons or warning
and the category of violation (i.e., moving violation or non-moving violation); 8A. specific
violations cited or warned; 9. the reason for the stop (i.e., moving violation or non-moving
violation, other [probable cause/BOLO]); 10. whether the vehicle occupant(s) were requested to
exit the vehicle; 11. whether the vehicle occupant(s) were frisked; 12. whether consent to search
the vehicle was requested and whether consent was granted; 12A. the basis for requesting consent
to search the vehicle; 13. whether a drug-detection canine was deployed and whether an alert
occurred; 13A. a description of the circumstances that prompted the deployment of a drugdetection canine; 14. whether a non-consensual search of the vehicle was conducted; 14A. the
circumstances that prompted a non-consensual search of the vehicle; 15. whether any contraband
or other property was seized; 15A. a description of the type and quantity of any contraband or
other property seized; 16. whether the vehicle occupant(s) were arrested, and if so, the specific
charges; 17. whether the vehicle occupant(s) were subjected to deadly, physical, mechanical or
chemical force; 17A. a description of the circumstances that prompted the use of force; and a
description of any injuries to state troopers and vehicle occupants as a result of the use of force;
18. the trooper’s race and gender; 19. the trooper’s specific assignment at the time of the stop (on
duty only) including squad.”).
217. Pittsburgh Decree, supra note 6.
218. L.A. Decree, supra note 8, at paras. 104-05.
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collection efforts.219 As a result, many official data collection efforts are not
capable of identifying individual officers whose enforcement activities are
questionable.
In each of the consent decrees and memoranda of understanding, the traffic
stop data are required to be entered into the departmental early intervention
database. In this respect, the effort to eliminate discrimination in traffic stops
becomes integrated into a comprehensive accountability program along with
efforts to both control the use of force and improve the citizen complaint
process.
E.

Court Appointed Monitors

All of the consent decrees and memoranda of understanding require the
appointment of a monitor responsible for reporting to the court about
compliance with the mandated reforms. While paid by the city in each case,
monitors are agents of the court and, in that respect, independent of the city
and police department to be monitored.220 Monitors represent an extremely
important advance over previous reform strategies. As discussed above, the
fatal weakness of blue ribbon commissions is their inability to implement or
even oversee the implementation of their recommendations.221 The Supreme
Court also has very limited power to enforce its decisions.222 The monitors
appointed under § 14141 litigation are analogous to the special masters that
have been appointed to oversee settlements in prison condition and mental
hospital cases. The history of these institutional reform efforts, moreover,
suggests that the implementation phase is usually a long and drawn out
struggle, a history that suggests mandated reforms are not readily adopted.223
The monitor in the Pittsburgh case, the first case settled under § 14141,
developed an extremely valuable three-tiered framework for analyzing
compliance with the consent decree. Primary compliance involves the
development of a formal policy on a particular aspect of police operations.
Secondary compliance involves evidence that the department has incorporated
the policy into training and supervision. Operational compliance, the third
level, involves evidence that officers comply with the policy in their routine

219. The author believes this is an extremely cynical and opportunistic position since officers
routinely voluntarily identify themselves on arrest reports, incident reports, and other
departmental reports.
220. L.A. Decree, supra note 8, at para. 161 (“The Monitor shall be an agent of the Court and
shall be subject to the supervision and orders of this Court, consistent with this agreement.”).
221. POLICE LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA, supra note 52, at 363.
222. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
223. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (1998).
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activities.224 This framework for analysis represents an important step forward
because previous reform strategies have generally been limited to what is here
defined as primary compliance.225
The monitors’ reports published to date suggest the value of a mandatory
monitoring process. First, the reports are lengthy and thorough, indicating that
the individual monitors take their assignments very seriously.226 Second, at
least one initial monitoring report, that for Washington, D.C., found that the
police department had met none of the deadlines specified in the memorandum
of understanding. Although the problem appears to be a matter of pervasive
organizational dysfunction rather than willful hostility, the report clearly
indicates that the department is not likely to achieve the mandated reforms
without sustained prodding by an external authority.227
The consent decree-monitoring process is still in its early stages, so it is
not possible to render a judgment on its success at this point. The newly
formed Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC) is completing an
evaluation of the process in Pittsburgh. PARC was established for the specific
purpose of providing technical assistance to monitors, and has held a
conference bringing together monitors, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and officials from
monitored police departments.228
VI. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NEW PARADIGM
A.

Achievements to Date

224. Auditor’s Eighteenth Quarterly Report, supra note 190, at 3 (“For the purposes of this
audit, ‘compliance’ consists of three components: primary compliance, secondary compliance,
and operational compliance. Primary compliance is viewed as the administrative piece of
compliance. It entails the creation of policy, procedure, rule, regulation, directive or command to
‘comply’ as required by the text of the decree. Secondary compliance deals with training,
supervision, audit and inspection, and discipline to ensure that a specific policy is being
implemented as designed. To achieve operational compliance, both the primary—policy and
directive—and secondary—training, supervision, audit and inspection, and discipline—must be
achieved, and the directives must, by matter of evidence, be followed in day-to-day operations of
the bureau.”).
225. ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, TURNING NECESSITY INTO
VIRTUE: PITTSBURGH’S EXPERIENCE WITH A FEDERAL CONSENT DECREE (2002),
http://www.vera.org/publications/publications_5.asp?publication_id=180, also available at
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Open=True&Item=563.
226. The New Jersey Monitor’s reports are available at www.nj.gov/lps/monitors.htm.
227. MICHAEL R. BROMWICH, SPECIAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITOR FOR THE
METROPOLITAN
POLICE
DEPARTMENT
73
(2002),
www.policemonitor.org/
specialreportjune12.pdf.
228. Information on PARC, including the activities referred to here are available at
http://www.parc.info.
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The new paradigm of police accountability is cause for cautious optimism
about the future of police reform. While previous reform efforts have achieved
much, they have also left much undone. Controversies over excessive force,
race discrimination, and corruption continue to embroil police departments
across the country. The new paradigm represents a major advance over
previous efforts by defining a specific set of best practices related to
accountability that represent a comprehensive, integrated program of reform,
with an overarching conceptual framework for accountability. The new
paradigm also involves a sophisticated understanding of the requirements for
lasting change in policing that builds upon the successes and failures of
previous reform strategies. The new paradigm reaches deep into police
organizations, shaping the on-the-street behavior of individual officers, and
potentially changing the organizational culture of departments in a positive
direction. With respect to use-of-force policies and practices, citizen complaint
procedures, traffic stop data collection, and early intervention systems, the
various consent decrees and memoranda of understanding go a long way
toward defining national standards.
Some of the monitoring reports of compliance with consent decrees and
memoranda of understanding provide grounds for optimism, while others do
not. The eighteenth report of the court-appointed monitor in Pittsburgh found
the city to be in primary and secondary compliance in seventy out of seventyfour tasks, but out of compliance in four tasks. Significantly, all of the out of
compliance tasks involved the Office of Municipal Investigation (OMI), the
independent citizen complaint agency, and not the Pittsburgh police
department.229 The sixth report of the New Jersey monitor found that the State
Police had made significant progress in many areas, although there were
problems in some other areas.230 On the other hand, the monitor in
Washington, D.C., found: “Despite substantial efforts in the past several
months to compensate for an extraordinarily slow start, MPD has failed to
accomplish virtually all of the milestones identified in the MOA within the
time periods specified.”231
The monitoring process itself is grounds for optimism since it creates an
institutionalized mechanism for ensuring implementation of reforms mandated
by consent decrees and memoranda of understanding. The idea of monitoring
sets a new standard for future reform efforts that may result from some process
other than federal litigation under § 14141.232
229. Auditor’s Eighteenth Quarterly Report, supra note 190, at 70.
230. Monitors’ Sixth Report, United States v. New Jersey, No. 99-5970 (D. N.J. July 19,
2002), http://www.nj.gov/lps/monitors_report_6.pdf.
231. BROMWICH, supra note 227, at 1-2.
232. Section 14141 litigation has led to the creation of the Police Assessment Resource
Center (PARC), which, in addition to providing technical assistance to monitors, represents an
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Grounds for Skepticism

There are good reasons for caution and skepticism about the potential of
the new paradigm, however. The history of policing is littered with promising
reforms that never fulfilled their promise and quietly faded away.233 Rank and
file police officers are well aware of this and are highly cynical about reforms
they see as passing fads.
1. From Policy to Practice
The first and most important reason for skepticism is that all of the policies
and procedures that comprise the new paradigm are essentially formal
administrative arrangements. To become operative they must achieve what the
Pittsburgh monitor defines as the third level of compliance: verifiable impact
on actual police operations.234 A use-of-force reporting system, for example,
requires that officers complete the mandatory reports, that they complete them
accurately, that supervisors give those reports meaningful review, and that
officers be disciplined for any and all violations of departmental policy. The
administration of such policies over time is one of the key components in
shaping the organizational culture of a police department. Through experience,
officers learn the organizational norms and the “going rate” for violations of
policy.235
In this regard, the Los Angeles Police Department represents a particularly
important cautionary tale. The chapter of the LAPD’s Board of Inquiry Report
on the Rampart Incident devoted to “Police Integrity Systems” describes thirtyone formal policies and procedures designed to ensure integrity.236 Yet, the
report conceded what critics of the LAPD have long argued: the department
does not effectively investigate alleged misconduct nor discipline officers who
are found guilty thereof. The independent report by the noted legal scholar
Erwin Chemerinsky concurred, concluding that the LAPD had an
organizational culture that condones misconduct.237
Similar concerns surround early intervention (EI) systems. The NIJ study
warned that they are enormously complex administrative procedures, requiring
institutionalized center of expertise on police accountability that is useful to jurisdictions where
there is no federal intervention. See generally PARC, at http://www.parc.info.
233. One of the best examples of a faded reform effort is the team policing movement of the
early 1970s, which vanished almost overnight. See LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., TEAM
POLICING: SEVEN CASE STUDIES 107 (1973).
234. Auditor’s Eighteenth Quarterly Report, supra note 190, at 3.
235. The “compliance problem” with administrative rulemaking is discussed in WALKER,
supra note 70.
236. See BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO THE RAMPART AREA CORRUPTION INCIDENT, supra note
8, at ch. 10.
237. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 551.
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close and continuing administrative attention. One EI system in that study
ceased functioning for at least a year as a result of the transition following the
appointment of a new police chief.238 A recent evaluation of the EI system in
Albuquerque, New Mexico found that it lacked much of the administrative
support necessary for it to function effectively.239 The court-appointed monitor
in Washington, D.C., found that the system there was not functioning at an
effective level.240 In July 2002 the New Jersey monitor expressed “grave
concern” about the lack of progress with development of the mandated MMPS
system.241 And most notoriously, the Los Angeles Police Department has not
implemented its TEAMS II system,242 even though it had been recommended
by the 1991 Christopher Commission report,243 and the LAPD has received a
$170,000 federal grant for that purpose.244
2. The Experience of Monitors To Date
A second reason for skepticism surrounds the implementation of the
consent decrees already in force. Although each decree includes the
appointment of a monitor to oversee implementation, to date the evidence of
the decrees’ effectiveness is mixed. The eighteenth, and most recent, report of
the Pittsburgh monitor found that the Pittsburgh Police Bureau was generally
in compliance with all mandated reforms, but the independent Office of
Municipal Investigations (OMI), which has responsibility for handling citizen
complaints, was not in compliance with respect to four mandated changes. The
monitor overseeing the New Jersey State Police reported considerable progress
by July 2002, although problems existed in certain areas of compliance.245 By
comparison, the monitor in Washington, D.C. reported that the Metropolitan
Police Department had missed virtually all of the deadlines established by the
Memorandum of Understanding.246 Similarly, the initial stages of
implementing the consent decrees in both Los Angeles and Cincinnati included
significant opposition and foot dragging from either the departmental
command or the police union.
238. Early Warning, supra note 22, at 4.
239. RICHARD JEROME, POLICE ASSESSMENT RESOURCE CENTER, POLICE OVERSIGHT
PROJECT: CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE 79-82 (2002), http://www.cabq.gov/council/pocstudy.pdf.
240. BROMWICH, supra note 227, at 73.
241. Monitors’ Sixth Report, supra note 230, at vii.
242. OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, REPORT FOR
THE QUARTER ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2002 2 (2002), http://www.lapdonline.org/pdf_files/boi/
5th_quarterly_report_02_11_15.pdf.
243. INDEP. COMM’N ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEP’T, supra note 94.
244. BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO THE RAMPART AREA CORRUPTION INCIDENT, supra note 8, at
140-41.
245. Monitors’ Sixth Report, supra note 230, at vii-viii
246. BROMWICH, supra note 227, at 73.
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In short, one should not assume that the existence of a legally enforceable
consent decree ensures the effective implementation of the specific mandated
reforms, much less a reduction in the use of excessive force or in racial
discrimination.
3. Costs
A third reason for caution involves the cost of implementing the required
dramatic short-term organizational changes. It has been estimated that
implementation of the two Cincinnati agreements will cost $13 million “just in
start up costs” for the provisions related to use of force.247 The City of Los
Angeles has appropriated $29 million in fiscal year 2001-02 and $38.3 million
in fiscal year 2002-03 for implementing the consent decree.248 Given the
serious financial constraints affecting all state and local governments in 2002,
there is serious cause for concern about the ability of some cities to bear the
costs of agreed upon police reforms.249
4. The Absence of Whistleblower Protection
A fourth reason for skepticism is the paradigm’s failure to address the
important issue of whistleblower protections. The Justice Department’s report,
Principles for Promoting Police Integrity, recommends that police departments
“should have in place appropriate protection against retaliation for officers
who report misconduct.”250 A critical failure of the current reforms is that this
issue is barely addressed by any of the consent decrees and memoranda of
understanding.
Effective whistle blower protection addresses two points that are part of
the conventional wisdom among most police experts. First, it has long been
recognized that one of the greatest impediments to achieving police
accountability is the so-called code of silence, or “blue curtain,” under which
officers do not report misconduct and refuse to testify against fellow
officers.251 It is widely recognized that the police subculture actively reinforces
the values of the code of silence. Second, it has long been recognized that
police departments do not have adequate procedures for rewarding good

247. Gregory Korte, Police Reforms could top $13M, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 24,
2002, at A1, http://enquirer.com/editoins/2002/06/24/loc_police_reforms_could.html.
248. LOS ANGELES POLICE DEP’T, LAPD CONSENT DECREE—STATUS REPORT TO THE
COURT (2002), http://www.lapdonline.org/pdf_files/boi/status_report_080102.pdf.
249. IRIS J. LAV, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, STATE FISCAL CONDITIONS
CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE; FEDERAL ASSISTANCE BADLY NEEDED (2002),
http://www.cbpp.org/0-20-02sfp.htm.
250. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 8.
251. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 86 at 68; INDEP. COMM’N ON THE LOS ANGELES
POLICE DEP’T, supra note 94.
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officers. This includes both officers who perform exceptionally well in the
routine course of work and those who report misconduct.252
Federal and state whistleblower protection laws currently exist. While a
discussion of the effectiveness of these laws is beyond the scope of this article,
a couple of points can be made with respect to their application in the police
context. First, the burden of enforcing these laws falls heavily on the individual
whistleblower, who generally faces organizational hostility, the enmity of
fellow workers, substantial legal costs, a long and drawn out struggle, and a
very uncertain outcome. Second, the police subculture poses particularly strong
impediments to the effectiveness of such laws. Officers generally work in
small groups (a partner, a precinct platoon, etc.) that operate in “lowvisibility” circumstances out in the field. The folklore of policing holds that
these work groups readily and easily punish fellow officers who do not
conform to the occupational norms and especially those who publicly criticize
the department.253
The various consent decrees and memoranda of understanding are silent on
the issue of whistleblower protection. This issue is also not addressed in such
blue ribbon commission reports as the Christopher Commission and the
Mollen Commission. The New York City Commission to Combat Corruption
has addressed this issue, but has never devoted more than four pages to it in
any single report.254 The independent report on the Los Angeles Police
Department following the Rampart scandal recommended “a system where
officers may report wrong-doing by other officers to the [LAPD] Inspector
General, with an assurance of confidentiality, and with protection from
reprisals.”255 Finally, there are no scholarly articles discussing how a
whistleblower protection procedure would operate in the special environment
of policing.
The development of meaningful whistleblower protections should be a
high priority on the agenda of police accountability reform efforts in the
immediate future.
VII. CONCLUSION
Litigation by the U.S. Justice Department represents a new paradigm of
police accountability. This article has argued that this new paradigm represents
252. Goldstein, Administrative Problems, supra note 67, at 167.
253. A famous case of such punishment is that of New York City police officer Frank Serpico
who (not entirely accurately) was regarded as the officer who “broke” the NYCPD corruption
scandal in the 1970’s. Allegedly, Serpico was “set up” by fellow officers and almost killed in
retaliation. See PETER MAAS, SERPICO, 11-12 (1973).
254. COMM’N TO COMBAT POLICE CORRUPTION, NEW YORK CITY, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION 63-67 (2001).
255. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 583.
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a specific set of policies and procedures that incorporate existing “best
practices” related to accountability. Of equal importance to culling the best
practices, these practices are integrated into a conceptual framework of police
reform that moves beyond previous reform efforts. The most important aspect
of this framework is the focus on organizational change rather than individual
officers or discrete police problems (e.g., use of deadly force). Finally, the new
paradigm represents a model of police reform that has the potential to achieve
a life of its own, independent of future § 14141 litigation by the Justice
Department. The list of “best practices” and the overarching conceptual
framework, particularly the focus on organizational change, is an agenda that
can be pursued by various means.
The new paradigm discussed in this article represents a significant advance
in the long effort to achieve higher standards of police accountability. It is the
occasion for some optimism about police reform. The new paradigm builds
upon past reform efforts, some of which made important contributions, but
some of which failed to achieve their goals.
While there is cause for optimism, it is premature to declare the new
paradigm a success. Serious police misconduct continues to plague many
departments in this country. The police, moreover, have a considerable record
in frustrating reform efforts. The new paradigm involves policies that reach
deep down into police organizations and have the potential for reshaping the
police officer subculture that has been able to frustrate so many past reforms.
Whether the new paradigm will succeed in transforming that subculture and
eliminating the major barriers to lasting reform remains to be seen.

